A Palestinian state : implications for security and American policy by Colbert, Jim
Published by 
THE JEWISH INSTITUTE 
FOR 
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
W A S H I N G T O N ,  D C
Implications for Security & American Policy A PALESTINIAN STATECopyright © 1999 by the Jewish Institute for National Security 
Affairs.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be produced or 
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, 
including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and 
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the holder of 
the copyright.
The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
1717 K Street, NW
Suite 800
Washington, DC 20006
World Wide Web:  http://www.jinsa.org
E-mail:  info@jinsa.org
Printed in the United States of America.
April 1999
ISBN    0-9644523-6-7  $10.00 US
The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), Inc., is 
an independent, non-partisan educational organization established in 
1976 to fulll a two-fold mandate: To educate the American public, 
and the Jewish community specically, about the importance of an 
effective U.S. defense capability so that our vital interests as 
Americans can be safeguarded,and; To inform the American defense and 
foreign policy community about the important role Israel can and 
does play in bolstering democratic interests in the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East.
The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Inc., incorporated 
in the District of Columbia, is a tax-exempt organization under 
section 501 (c)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code.
EDITED BY
Jim Colbert
COVER DESIGN & PAGE LAYOUT
Dan Smithiii
vii
1
7
15
27
41
49
INTRODUCTION
Thomas Neumann & Shoshana Bryen
A PALESTINIAN STATE AND AMERICAN 
INTERESTS
Senator Rudy Boschwitz
WATER RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION & FUTURE 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS
Paul Michael Wihbey
TERRORISM AND A PALESTINIAN STATE
Meyrav Wurmser
THE PLO AND THE FUTURE OF JORDAN
David Wurmser
A PALESTINIAN STATE: EFFECTS ON THE 
REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER
Gerald M. Steinberg
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF A 
PALESTINAN STATE
Ilan Berman
Table of Contentsv
Introduction
T
he United States has ample reason to believe the establishment of an inde-
pendent Palestinian State in territories vacated by Israel would be inimical 
to American interests.  
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and its offshoot the Palestinian 
Authority (PA), have a long history of non-democratic, anti-Western and 
specifically anti-American activities and rhetoric. The period of self-rule by the 
PA has shown no growth in democracy, respect for the rule of law or peaceful 
intentions regarding Israel. The PA has failed to keep financial and political 
commitments made to the Congress, commitments that were the quid pro quo for 
congressional allocations of American funds to the PA.
1. The United States has had many years in which to assess the Palestine 
Liberation Organization’s behavior regarding U.S. interests. During the time 
prior to the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993, the PLO leadership:
•  Instigated and fomented acts of terrorism inside Israel which killed numerous 
Israeli civilians and American citizens;
•  Instigated and fomented acts of terrorism outside Israel which killed Israeli 
civilians and diplomatic personnel and American citizens and diplomatic 
personnel, including Ambassador Cleo Noel and Leon Klinghoffer;
•  Revolted against King Hussein of Jordan, resulting in the expulsion of the 
PLO to southern Lebanon. In Lebanon, the PLO created a “state within 
a state” which was used to terrorize the local Lebanese population, invite 
Syrian occupation of parts of Lebanon which continues to this day, and 
rain missiles on northern Israel; 
•  Opened and managed training camps for terrorist groups including the Italian 
Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army and the German Baader Meinhof 
Gang; and trained communist revolutionaries in El Salvador, Nicaragua and 
other places in Central and South America. In these activities, they made 
common cause with and promoted the interests of the Soviet Union, the East 
German Stasi and other communist countries; and
•  Yasser Arafat and the PLO aligned themselves with Saddam Hussein 
before, during and after the Gulf War. During the Gulf War SCUD attacks 
on Israel, Palestinians were observed on their rooftops, calling for Saddam 
to attack Israel with poison gas. vi
2.  The United States has had nearly six years in which to assess Palestinian 
intentions and capabilities regarding the fulfillment of its commitments in the 
Oslo Accords. During that time the Palestinian Authority:
•  Failed to change the PLO Charter calling for the destruction of Israel. 
(The December 1998 legislative session in Gaza did not meet the internal 
requirements of the Charter for its own emendation, although the United 
States has indicated that it is generally satisfied on that count.);
•  Placed more men under arms than permitted by the Accords and put 
individuals wanted for security crimes and terrorism into the Palestinian 
Police. The “police” furthermore have been armed with weapons not 
permitted by the Oslo Accords and are organized into army-style units rather 
than police-style units.  Wye Memorandum agreements on the limitation 
of police have been dismissed by PA Police Chief Ghazi Jabali, “There is no 
problem. We will get around it by reallocating policemen such that one who 
serves in one location can serve in another. We will get around it by adopting 
a policy of transferring policemen.”(Al Quds, 4 Nov 98)  Muhammad 
Dahlan, PA Preventive Security Chief in Gaza said, “We will have no 
problem providing one list of policemen and a second list of policemen who 
do administrative work.”  (Al-Ayyam, 26 Oct 98);
•  Continues to call for violence and threaten violence if their demands are not 
met.  In 1998, a senior Palestinian Authority figure threatened that a visit by 
the US Speaker of the House to a site in Western Jerusalem owned by the 
United States would result in violence – for which, he noted, the Speaker 
would be responsible.  Security cooperation with Israel was a non-negotiable 
part of the Oslo Accord, the underpinning of all of Israel’s commitments to 
the Palestinians.  Security cooperation however, has been sporadic and tied 
to Palestinian demands for further Israeli concessions;
•  Spent millions of American taxpayer dollars – allocated by Congress for the 
advancement of economic infrastructure and education in the PA-controlled 
areas – without proper accounting procedures or transparency.  Money 
given to the Palestinian Broadcasting Authority has been spent to produce 
children’s programming extolling violence, martyrdom and the destruction 
of Israel, most recently in January 1999;
•  Jailed journalists who criticized the PA and Yasser Arafat and failed to develop 
an independent judiciary for the protection of citizens from the regime.   
Three people were executed by the PA in a six month period in 1998-1999 – 
following trials of less than a day, and with no right of appeal;
•  Failed to extradite to Israel figures wanted by Israeli authorities for acts 
of terrorism; and
•  Called for demonstrations against the United States during the Gulf 
crises of 1997-98. Associated Press correspondent Ibrahim Barzak reported vii
on 17 February: 
Hundreds of Palestinian high school and university students, meanwhile, 
marched in support of Iraq through the West Bank town of Bethlehem, 
burning US and Israeli flags and shouting, ‘Saddam, we want the 
chemicals!’ and ‘Beloved Saddam, hit Tel Aviv.’
One Palestinian Authority figure was quoted as saying, “The Israelis are 
cleaning their (sealed) rooms. The Palestinians are cleaning their roof,” a 
reference to Palestinians cheering from their rooftops as SCUD missiles 
landed on Israel in 1991. In December 1998, thousands of Palestinians rioted 
and burned American flags in support of Saddam just days after President 
Clinton visited Gaza.
It is reasonable to conclude from the behavior of the PLO and the PA that the 
sine qua non of democratic societies – compliance with treaties signed, the rule 
of law, democracy and personal freedom – were never part of the ideology of the 
PLO, and have not been developed in the areas controlled by the PA after the 
Oslo Accords.  Since these areas contain 97 percent of the Palestinian population 
in the territories once governed by Israeli military occupation, the United States 
has good reason to believe that the establishment of an independent state in ANY 
territory vacated by Israel would be inimical to American national security and 
political interests. American interests include, but are not limited to a strong 
and secure Israel serving as an anchor of U.S. policies in the Middle East and 
Eastern Mediterranean region. A strong Israel, for example, is able to move 
forward in a security relationship with Turkey, a strategically located NATO 
ally. A weakened Israel, however it comes to be weakened, is less of an asset 
for the United States.
3.  The United States should oppose the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian State owing to:
• The ability of the PA to provide safe haven to terrorists, as has already 
been demonstrated;
• The ability of the PA to import offensive weapons through an independent 
seaport and airport. Offensive weapons could make Israel’s international 
airport vulnerable to missile attack and could endanger the U.S. Sixth Fleet 
when it is anchored in Haifa;
• The ability of the PA to join with countries such as Iraq and Iran in military 
alliances which could include the acceptance of Iraqi or Iranian troops west 
of the Jordan River. Such agreements – and such troop movements – would 
have major implications for US policy regarding Israel, Jordan, Turkey, 
Lebanon and Saudi Arabia;viii
• The fundamentally undemocratic, anti-Western thrust of Palestinian 
policies thus far and the likelihood that a newly independent state 
will continue those policies; and
• The threat posed by such a state to America’s democratic ally, Israel, and 
to other friendly states in the region. 
Congressmen Jim Saxton, Matt Salmon and Majority Whip Tom DeLay have 
submitted a resolution in Congress that reads in part:
“Whereas the United States has traditionally opposed the unilateral 
declaration of a Palestinian State because of concerns that such a 
State could pose a threat to Israel and could have a destabilizing 
effect on the entire Middle East;
Whereas the United States stated its position, after Israel and the 
Palestinians signed the Oslo Accords, that all questions of Palestinian 
sovereignty and statehood are matters which must be mutually 
agreed upon by the parties;
Whereas the Palestinian Cabinet on 24 September 1998 stated, ‘at 
the end of the interim period, it (the Palestinian government) shall 
declare the establishment of a Palestinian state on all Palestinian 
land occupied since 1967, with Jerusalem as the eternal capital 
of the Palestinian State;
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), that 
it is the sense of the Congress that:
1. Israel, and Israel alone, can determine its security needs;
2. The final status of the Palestinian entity can only be determined 
through bilateral negotiations and agreement between Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority;
3. The President must reaffirm that any such unilateral declaration 
of a Palestinian State would be a grievous violation of the Oslo 
Accords, would seriously impede any possibility of advancing the 
peace process, and would have severe negative consequences for 
Palestinian relations with the United States; and
4. The President should now publicly and unequivocally state 
that the United States will actively oppose such a unilateral 
declaration and will not extend recognition to any unilaterally 
declared Palestinian State.”
The Palestinian Authority’s history of compliance with agreements with 
both Israel and the United States has been riddled with opposition 
and violations. As a result, irrespective of how a Palestinian State is ix
established, it will be inimical to American interests, and will force the 
United States to deal with its destabilizing effects in the region.
Thomas Neumann      Shoshana Bryen
Executive Director      Director, Special Projects1
A Palestinian State and 
American Interests
Senator Rudy Boschwitz
A PERSONAL NOTE
While in the Senate, and especially during my time as a member of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and chairman of the Middle East Sub-Committee, I was 
often asked, both by Israelis and others, how Israel should structure a peace with its 
neighbors, and particularly how much land should be “traded” for peace. My answer 
was always that this was for the Israelis to decide, and we Americans should not seek 
to compel the Israelis to make a deal they found inimical to their interests. Nor should 
we create a situation that would compel a certain outcome.
I often told the Israelis that I was a Senator from Minnesota, that my state was 
about 1200 miles from the oceans, and that even on the other sides of those oceans 
there were no real foes that threatened our existence. Israel, on the other hand, 
was a small narrow country, not as wide in spots as the distance from downtown 
Minneapolis to downtown St. Paul, the Twin Cities. Additionally, most of Israel’s 
neighbors are larger, more populous, and sworn enemies of that democracy which 
refuse to make peace with Israel. Then consider that the West Bank, which rises to 
heights of 3000 feet above the Mediterranean, is the high ground that overlooks the 
narrow plain where most Israelis live (in the Tel Aviv area particularly). Occupying 
that high ground is an enormous strategic advantage. 
Security is so different for Americans, I believe, that it is impossible to substitute 
our thoughts and feelings for the problems facing the Israelis. Their long “special 
relationship” with the United States is based upon shared values of democracy, justice 
and human dignity. I felt that we could rely on them to make a just peace. It is with 
these thoughts in mind that I approach the question of Palestinian statehood and 
evaluate the actions of Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Authority.
RUDY BOSCHWITZ served as U.S. Senator from the state of Minnesota from 1978 to 1991. During 
his time in Congress, Mr. Boschwitz was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and 
served as chairman of the Middle East Sub-Committee for six years. He is a member of the Board 
of Directors of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs.2
M
embers of a Palestinian Authority delegation that visited Washington in 
February 1999 boasted to reporters that relations between the United 
States and the Palestinians are warmer under the Clinton administration 
than under any previous American government. 
In a meeting with congressional staffers, Nabil Sha’ath of the PA reportedly 
talked about creating and sustaining some five separate committees that fall under 
the aegis of the “U.S.-PA Bilateral Committee usually chaired by Secretary of 
State Albright and Yasser Arafat.” According to Sha’ath, these committees include 
economic investment, economic assistance, legal assistance (rule of law, legal training, 
drafting legislation), exchange programs with Congress and the Executive Branch, 
and businessmen’s committees. These committees, he suggested, are separate from 
the peace process and the CIA-PA security cooperation group.
Such U.S.-Palestinian coziness is a tragic mistake - because morally, strategically 
and economically, an American-Palestinian entente is a disaster for American 
interests. American support for a Palestinian State would be a mistake of enormous 
proportions. It would undermine our ally Israel and reward violence, demagoguery 
and treachery. 
It is morally wrong because Yasser Arafat consistently sides with tyrants and 
America-haters. His closest allies are Iran and Iraq. He has warm relations with North 
Korea, Syria, and Cuba. His own regime suppresses and tortures political dissidents, 
shuts down opposition newspapers, brutally persecutes Christian Arabs, and provides 
haven for terrorists who have murdered American citizens. The Palestinian Authority 
has executed three people in the past six months - after trials lasting only hours, with 
no right of appeal. Nothing in the formative years of the Palestinian Authority give 
us reason to believe that a Palestinian State would have standards of justice, freedom, 
rule of law and personal liberty that in any way mirror the operative principles of 
the United States or our ally Israel.
Economically, an American-Palestinian alliance would also be a disaster for the 
United States. Foreign donations, earmarked for social services and education, 
have more often than not ended up lining the coffers of Arafat’s ministers and 
government officials. The $500 million already sunk into Gaza by the United States 
has joined billions of dollars of foreign aid that have disappeared into a black hole 
of Palestinian Authority graft and mismanagement. The additional $900 million 
that the Administration wants Congress to give the PA will probably end up in the 
same place; the corruption of the Palestinian Authority shows no sign of abating. In 
his February meeting with congressional staff members, Nabil Sha’ath denounced 
Congress as “unhelpful,” “nosy” and wrongly biased in favor of Israel for wanting to 
determine what had happened to the previous donations. 
Supporting Palestinian independence is a strategic mistake as well. America’s 
security interests in the Middle East require stability and moderation. Arafat 
represents exactly the opposite. He coddles and collaborates with radical terrorists 
who wage war on Israel, and has made the West Bank and Gaza Strip internationally 
recognized as havens for terrorists. He has made no bones about its expansionist 3
desires, coveting Jordan, which he considers part of “Greater Palestine.” If there 
is a Palestinian State, it will be a launching pad for military adventures that will 
drown the Middle East in bloodshed. 
Arafat has already shown in Lebanon what he can do if given military control 
over territory. It was Arafat’s 1970 attempt to overthrow King Hussein of Jordan 
that led to the PLO’s expulsion from that country. Arafat led his troops to Lebanon, 
subverted the fragile balance of the existing Muslim-Christian government there, 
set up a puppet state in the south of Lebanon and fomented the Lebanese civil 
war of 1976. This, in turn, led to a Syrian occupation of Lebanon that continues 
to this day - with 40,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon and another 100,000 “guest 
workers” there. It is Lebanon’s continuing inability to assert government control 
in the south that gives Syrian and Iranian-backed Hezballah terrorists free access 
to Israel’s northern border. 
The United States should not be part of giving Arafat the opportunity for a 
similar performance on Israel’s eastern border.
Palestinian subversion of Jordan would be a direct threat to the security of Israel 
and a blow to American interests in the region. Amos Perlmutter, editor of “The 
Journal of Strategic Studies,” wrote in The Washington Times (March 1999) about 
the potential takeover of Jordan by “peaceful” means:
Now that King Hussein is dead, Mr. Arafat is setting the stage, 
ideologically and tactically, for eventual Palestinian domination of Jordan. 
He is certainly not foolhardy enough to try to overtake Jordan by force as 
he failed to do in 1970, nor is he in a hurry. There is a more subtle way to 
achieve the same result: calling for democratic elections.
 
Palestinians are estimated to comprise more than 60% of the population 
of Jordan. Palestinian intellectuals in the West Bank and the United States 
have all of a sudden begun calling for democracy in Jordan.
Perlmutter believes Arafat is still aiming for  “Palestine” on both sides of the Jordan 
River, and that Israel and Jordan must work together to prevent it:
Separate bilateral security arrangements must be signed between… 
Israel and Jordan, Israel and the United States. The reason is clear. This 
will weaken any Palestinian effort to create conditions for a confederation 
with Jordan, a military alliance with Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad, 
revolutionary Iran, or any other present or future belligerent Arab or 
Muslim state that has no peace treaty with Israel…. It is in the interest 
of both the Israel government and the Jordanian Hashemite monarchy 
to deter and discourage Palestinian utopian expansionist ideas that 
could be fulfilled through democratic means… There is nothing wrong 
with democracy in Jordan or Palestine unless it means a step toward 4
the fulfillment of the complete Palestine utopia… In view of present 
Palestinian aspirations, (a Jordanian-Palestinian) confederation will 
only threaten Israeli security.
Under Perlmutter’s utopian scenario, a “peaceful” confederation between a Palestinian 
State and Jordan would only be a stage leading to the bloody subversion of Jordan, 
Israel and American interests. Under Perlmutter’s scenario, moreover, the United 
States would be called upon to fulfill security obligations to Israel.
Over the past decade and a half, the United States and Israel have established 
strong security ties, including a rotating American military presence in Israel. The 
U.S. Sixth Fleet is a frequent and welcome visitor in Haifa harbor, with thousands of 
American service personnel on ships and on land. The U.S. Army and Marines hold 
exercises both with the IDF and using Israeli ranges in the desert.  Military-to-military 
exchanges are a frequent occurrence and groups of American military personnel find 
Israel an excellent place for vacation and R&R.  
Thus far, however, nothing in those arrangements requires the United States 
to provide for the defense of Israeli territory, nor is such a possibility an attractive 
one for either country.  
The West Bank is a formidable barrier to conventional military attack from the 
east, providing a vital shield for American interests in Israel. Dr. Dore Gold, Israel’s 
permanent representative to the United Nations, in a paper entitled Fundamental 
Factors in a Stabilized Middle East: Security, Territory and Peace, described the 
geography protecting both Israel and American activity in Israel:
[The West Bank’s] north-south hill ridge might only be 3,000 feet high, 
but it is set against the Jordan River and the Dead Sea, which is 1,200 
feet below sea level. Therefore, an attacking army from the east faces a net 
4,200-foot incline that must be traversed over 15 miles alone. Again, since 
there are only five east-west routes connecting the Jordan River to the 
Mediterranean, the attacker must move along predictable axes that can be 
anticipated and defended with relatively small forces. 
…The Iraqi-Jordanian border is approximately 210 miles east of the 
West Bank; advanced units of an Iraqi division could easily traverse 
this distance in 36 hours – in less time than the reserve mobilization 
of the IDF.
He continues later in the same article:
Since the Palestinians are not a major Arab power, an Israeli-Palestinian 
understanding would not directly modify the hostile intent of a major 
adversary of Israel. The Palestinians have laid claim to territory that is 5
vital to Israel’s defense against an Arab state war coalition to its east. Thus, 
an Israeli-Palestinian territorial understanding might only increase Israeli 
vulnerabilities without addressing the claims of a major Arab military 
power like Iraq or an Islamic power like Iran further eastward. A stable 
peace must preserve Israel’s access to the West Bank in order to defend 
itself against enemy attacks from the east, while removing the burden of 
military rule for its Palestinian Arab population.
Israel and the United States share concerns about terrorism, instability, and 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile capability 
in the region. The two share technology and weapons systems and Israel is a 
partner to the United States in the development of ballistic missile defenses. 
The emerging Turkey, Israel, Jordan security axis benefits the United States 
as well as the parties. 
The United States and the Palestinians share no strategic interests, and share 
only a limited interest in Palestinian self-rule – which is already a reality, with 97 
percent of the Palestinians once governed by Israeli military occupation now under 
the political control of the PA. 
The Palestinian Authority, and its appointed religious leaders and PA-controlled 
media have engaged in a continual campaign of anti-American rhetoric. It is 
impossible to ignore the possible impact that this will have on the opinions and 
actions of the Palestinians – directly or indirectly placing Americans in the region 
in danger. Following American raids on Iraq in December, tens of thousands of 
Palestinians rioted on the West Bank, burning American flags and loudly supporting 
Saddam Hussein. Arafat has, in fact, been Saddam’s chief supporter during and 
since the invasion of Kuwait.
Ultimately, the question for the United States boils down to whether the 
Palestinian Authority (or a future Palestinian State) will be a friend to the United 
States or will be simply another violent, anti-democratic, anti-Western country hostile 
to American principles and American interests in the region. 
So far, at least, there are few promising signs.
And, as so often happens in regional matters, the United States and Israel are 
asking themselves the same question about their future with the Palestinians. What 
kind of government will the Palestinians have? What kind of neighbor will it be? 
A story, apocryphal perhaps, is told about a discussion in the Israeli Cabinet about 
maps of hypothetical borders with a Palestinian Authority. Two maps emerged 
prominently. The first gave the Palestinian Authority 60 percent of the territory 
of Judea and Samaria, and suggested that Israel annex the other 40 percent. The 
second reversed the proportions. 
When asked to justify the borders, the proponent of the first map said, “When 
the final status negotiations are finished, our problems with the Palestinians will be 6
resolved and I believe they will cease to be a hostile neighbor. Therefore, my borders 
reflect the ‘good neighbor’ status I believe we will achieve.”
The proponent of the more conservative map said, “I believe that even after 
we finish our negotiations and the last paper is signed, the Palestinians will still 
be hostile to the premise and the reality of the State of Israel. Therefore, the 
borders reflect my belief that Israel must hold defensible positions against future 
Palestinian attacks.”
The dangers posed by the Palestinian government to both Israeli and American 
interests should be recognized in creating a viable peace formula. The eventual shape 
of Israeli-Palestinian borders and relations should, first and foremost, reflect Israel’s 
determination of its security needs. The United States should be Israel’s patron 
and supporter, without trying to substitute its vision of the future for that of the 
Israeli government. But, there are definite American interests at stake. The central 
dilemma for both the United States and Israel, according to Gold, is “finding a 
formula for peacemaking that reduces the chances of conflict breaking out without 
increasing Israeli vulnerabilities to a point that necessitates greater American 
interventionism in the future.”  
Therefore, the United States should clearly enunciate its moral, strategic and 
economic concerns about the behavior of the Palestinian Authority over the 
past six years and reject calls to recognize a unilaterally declared independent 
Palestinian State.
And what if the circumstance should arise in which a Palestinian State is declared 
as a result of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations?  
Israel, certainly, will determine the quality of its relations with the new state.  But 
the quality of the relationship any Palestinian entity or state has with the United 
States should reflect American standards of democracy, freedom and respect for the 
rule of law. The United States must insist on justice in the name of American citizens 
murdered by the PLO and under the rule of the Palestinian Authority. From U.S. 
Ambassador Cleo Noel in 1973, to Leon Klinghoffer, Nachshon Waxman, Alissa 
Flatow and many others, nothing less will do.
It is for good reasons, based on shared values, that the United States has for so 
long had what it calls a “special relationship” with Israel. The Palestinian Authority 
has exhibited none of these values. Since the Palestinians have as yet done nothing 
to deserve a special relationship with the United States, it would be wrong to 
treat them as if they have.7
Water Resource Distribution 
& Future Israeli-Palestinian 
Relations
Paul Michael Wihbey  
R
ising populations in the Middle East are forcing a dramatic new look at the 
significance of water in the region. Although volumes have been written 
about the overarching importance of oil to the stability and economic 
well-being of the area, relatively little research has been devoted to the political, 
economic, and security implications of water distribution in the area. Issues relating 
to water management, scarcity, and self-sufficiency are yet to impact on the public 
policy debates that surround Middle Eastern peace and stability. 
According to a recent World Bank study on Middle East and North African 
(MENA) water resources, the region is considered the poorest in fresh water 
resources, amounting to only 0.9 percent of total world resources, for a population 
that represents 5 percent of the world total. With a high population growth rate of 
3.5 percent, overexploitation of groundwater resources and inefficient use of water 
for agricultural and urban use, the per capita availability of water in MENA has 
fallen from 870,000 gallons to 333,000 gallons per year, the lowest in the world. 
That represents a third of Asia’s water availability levels and 15 percent of Africa’s. 
Given current trends, the region’s water resources are expected to be reduced by 
half by 2025. Water experts state that the equivalent of a second Nile River is 
required to meet current regional needs.1
Of particular concern are the relations between Israel and her neighbors over 
water sharing. With the exception of Israel’s coastal plain, most of the surrounding 
region is semi-arid or arid, with the bulk of crop production irrigated. Rainfall 
is less than 10 inches per year. Half of Israel is desert, and the ready availability 
of irrigation water is the only way to prevent creeping desertification. The large 
degree of demand, derived from agricultural needs, is producing a strategic deficit 
PAUL MICHAEL WIHBEY is an Adjunct Fellow at the Washington office of the 
Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. Mr. Wihbey specializes in 
American and Persian Gulf energy and security issues, and has served as a consultant 
to the U.S. Department of Defense and several Congressional offices on Middle East 
security, political and economic issues. His work has appeared in The Washington 
Times and Oil and Gas Journal, as well as a number of scholarly publications.8
of the water supply. Driven by rapid increases in population, such as immigration 
in the case of Israel and birth rate in the case of the Palestinians, both the Israeli 
government and the Palestinian Authority are hard-pressed to meet the demands 
of domestic consumption, water for the industrial sector, and agriculture. The 
severity of the crisis is best illustrated in Gaza, where each Palestinian has access 
to less than 15 gallons of water per day, and where the absence of proper sewage 
disposal systems has led to outbreaks of disease, which portends any number of 
crisis or conflict scenarios stemming from the availability of a natural but limited 
strategic resource, fresh water.   
How these contentious issues can affect security relations between Israel and 
her Arab neighbors has been demonstrated as recently as March 15, 1999, when 
Jordan held a special cabinet meeting in response to Israel’s decision to halve its 
annual allocation of 2 billion cubic feet of water to Jordan, as stipulated in the 1994 
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty. Jordanian Prime Minister Abdul Raouf Rawabdeh 
stated, “The water deal is an official agreement signed by the two sides, and we will 
insist on its implementation as it is.” In response, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu denied that Israel was backtracking on the agreement, and insisted that 
the reduction was a result of severe drought in the region. Both sides have agreed to 
additional meetings to try to find solutions to the water shortage.2 
This crisis is the first test of domestic leadership for newly crowned King 
Abdullah. In January, Jordan announced a state of drought due to inadequate 
rainfall (two-thirds of the kingdom’s water supply comes from rainfall). Lacking 
expensive desalinization plants and faced with a 50 percent reduction of Israel’s 
water allocation, it is highly probable that the Jordanian government will mandate 
water rationing and other contingency plans. The social, economic and political 
implications of a prolonged emergency could present Abdullah with a crisis 
that alters Jordan’s relations with Israel, as well as affects issues of Jordanian 
domestic stability. Jordan’s water deficit is expected to increase to 250 million 
cubic meters by 2010, despite $5 billion of investments in water resources 
over the next decade.3
Israel and Water Resources:
Three major water sources supply two-thirds of Israel’s water requirements:
•  The Lake Kinneret (Sea of Galilee) basin–Israel’s only surface water source, 
it supplies Israel with about one-third of its total annual water supply. The 
quality of its water permits use in drinking and agriculture. The Lake Kinneret 
basin currently provides about 610 million cubic meters of water.
•   The Coastal Aquifer–an underground reservoir extending from Mount 
Carmel in the north to the Gaza Strip in the south. The Coastal Aquifer 
currently supplies about 450 million cubic meters. 
•   The Mountain Aquifer–an underground reservoir composed mainly of 
limestone, at the central mountain ridge of the West Bank. The water is 9
of high quality and is utilized for domestic consumption. The Mountain 
Aquifer currently provides about 740 million cubic meters.
Along with underground water supplies, these combined sources make 
up Israel’s National Water System. However, a 1992 Nativ Center study by 
geologist Martin Sherman found that Israel’s population utilized almost all 
available water, and low-grade water and recycled sewage has been adapted for 
agricultural irrigation.4
The quantity and quality of each of the sources that make up Israel’s national 
water supply are currently conditioned by political, environmental and managerial 
problems. 
•   The Kinneret basin is fed by the Hatsbani River in Lebanon, the Banias 
River and the Dan River presently flowing through Israeli territory. In the 
1960s, Syria attempted to divert these water sources away from Israel to the 
Syrian-controlled Yarmuk basin. These attempts were principal contributing 
factors to the 1967 Israel-Syrian war over the Golan. Israel’s presence in the 
Golan since 1967 has in part resulted from its need to ensure the continued 
flow of these streams into the Kinneret. Since continuing drought is expected 
to force rationing and cuts in the Damascus water supply this summer, and 
has already forced the government to import barley crop/animal feed for the 
first time in 10 years, the importance and attractiveness of this water resource 
to Syria should not be ignored.
•   The Coastal Aquifer is suffering serious deterioration of its water supply 
as a result of:
-Salinization resulting from seawater intrusion, with concentrations 
unsuitable for unrestricted irrigation, of at least 10 percent of the 
1,700 wells currently on the coastal strip, according to the Israel 
Hydrological Service;5
-Overpumping resulting from further encroachment of seawater 
interface, and preventing the flushing of contaminants into the sea;
-Groundwater contamination by fuel at several sites;
-High nitrate concentrations caused by intensive use of fertilizers in 
agriculture and irrigation with sewage effluents;
-Contamination of wells in the Haifa/Tel Aviv high-density area through 
water pollution. These wells have been taken out of service, further 
reducing the drinking supply.
•   As the Coastal Aquifer is being degraded; the Mountain Aquifer is becoming 
the main source of drinking water for Israel. According to the Nativ report, 
the Mountain Aquifer, which is currently supplying key areas like Tel Aviv, 
Jerusalem and Beersheba, is the most important long-term source of water 10
for Israel. However, because of political considerations arising from the 
peace process, the utilization of this source has not been expanded, so as 
not to create a dependency on it as the exclusive future water source for 
the population on the coast. 
Crisis over Water Resources:                                                                                                         
Israel and the Palestinians
On December 17, 1982, the United Nations General Assembly condemned Israel 
“for its exploitation of the national resources of the occupied Palestinian and 
other Arab Territories.”6 The United Nations further reaffirmed “that all measures 
undertaken by Israel to exploit the human, natural and all other resources, wealth 
and economic activities in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories 
are illegal” and called upon Israel to desist from such measures. Since then, 
Israeli activities relating to water use in the West Bank and Gaza have been 
conditioned by international pressures, including the Water Resources Group of 
the Multilateral Peace Process that was established in January 1992 and designed 
to support bilateral negotiations by increasing practical cooperation between the 
interested parties. However, progress on resolving water-related issues between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians has been arduous at best, nonexistent at worst. There 
are two primary reasons for the impasse:
1.  Legal/Political. Future territorial adjustments that will help secure Israel’s 
water supply from the Mountain Aquifer require that Israeli sovereignty be 
exercised over critical and disputed areas of the mountain ridge. Israeli access to 
this water would involve shifting Israel’s ‘permanent’ boundaries several miles 
east of the current 1967 Green Line border. Israeli restrictions on the usage of 
water extraction from the Mountain Aquifer have resulted in Palestinian claims 
that they are being unfairly denied sufficient water requirements. The Israelis in 
turn claim that the water from the Aquifer flows naturally into Israel, and so is 
legally theirs by the rights of natural flow and historic use.
2.  Security. Any attempt by the Palestinian Authority to prevent the flow of 
mountain water to Israel, either by deliberate and punitive measures, or even by 
developing an effective modern system of wells, could have a deleterious effect 
on relations between the two sides. West Bank water currently makes up at 
least 30 percent of Tel Aviv’s water supply. A hostile, inefficient or irresponsible 
Palestinian approach to shared use of the aquifer would leave Israel’s urban 
and industrial centers vulnerable and subject to negative social and economic 
consequences. Any serious interference with the natural flow of these resources 
toward the 3 million person population of the coastal plain could not only 
deprive that densely-inhabited and cultivated region of a significant part of its 
water supply, but could also cause serious damage to the saline water balance 11
in parts of the aquifer on the coastline.  
Transferring more territory to the Palestinian Authority is therefore not only a 
matter of direct security, but also a matter of water distribution. For Israel, water 
becomes a key component in its strategic and political calculus towards its relations 
with the Palestinians and any final agreement on boundaries. This explains the 
significance of certain requirements that are connected to redeployment issues like 
natural reserve areas and agricultural development. 
Toward Resolution?                                                                                                                                           
Israeli-Palestinian Water Disputes
To date, attempts to resolve Israeli-Palestinian disputes over water resources have 
failed to achieve significant headway. On August 27, 1998, the Israeli Water 
Commissioner Meir Ben-Meir, Deputy Palestinian Water Commissioner Fadel 
Kawash, and several other senior officials, including the Co-Chairman of the 
Israeli-Palestinian Water Committee, met to discuss serious problems on an array 
of water related issues. The meeting was notable for the confrontational atmosphere 
and the severity of charges that were leveled at the participants. The meeting 
highlighted the gap in the positions of the two parties. 
  The Palestinians claimed that the severe water shortages in the West Bank 
were compounded by inaccurate Israeli pumping figures, and that Israel was 
failing to fulfill its commitments under the Water Annex of the Oslo Agreement. 
The Palestinians angrily denounced the great disproportion of water available 
to Jewish settlers in comparison to neighboring Palestinians, whose access to 
water is one-sixth that of the settlers. The Palestinians claimed that as a result, 
a new black market in water, with prices as high as 25 NIS (New Israeli Shekel) 
per cubic meter, was introducing a new criminal element into the West Bank. 
Furthermore, the IDF was charged with preventing the connection of water 
pipelines between West Bank villages.
  Summing up the Israeli response, Ben-Meir stated that the Oslo Agreement 
is not a solution to the water problem, and that “We cannot divide the deficit of 
water between us.” The basic operating principle was to be based on equality for 
humanitarian needs. Nevertheless, the outstanding practical issues – like forging 
an agreement, procuring money for investments, and determining the water source 
– remained unanswered. Even the ‘solution’ of desalinization plants could not find 
acceptance, since the cost of the new water would be too high for the Palestinians 
to buy. The Israeli position was that donor countries should not provide funds 
for the construction of plants, but should rather subsidize the costs of desalinated 
water for the Palestinians over a ten-year period.7
         According to the Palestinians, Israelis consume 80 percent of the 
West Bank Mountain Aquifer, leaving only 20 percent for the Palestinians. And 
because the Interim Agreement makes no provision for equitable sharing of water 12
resources, severe water shortages in the future will impact disproportionately 
more on Palestinians than Israelis. However, water shortages affect West Bank 
Jewish settlements as well. Kiryat Arba, near Hebron is without water once a 
week; Mevo Dotan was nearly evacuated for lack of supply, and the Telem and 
Adura settlements have had chronic water problems. When the Israeli government 
built a new $2 million well for the Palestinian town of Jenin, the PA failed to 
connect the well to Palestinian consumers, as had been agreed upon. In areas like 
Hebron, Bethlehem, Tekoa and Saflit, Israeli authorities provided the necessary 
licensing for additional wells for Palestinians, only to have PA inaction, negligence 
or corruption prevent the completion of the projects. Adding to the problem 
is PA indifference to the stealing of water from water pipes in places like 
Hebron. Taken in trucks, the water is then resold at a hefty profit to other 
Palestinians. Antiquated water systems in the Palestinian municipalities often 
go unrepaired because of resistance from wealthy local well owners who profit 
from lack of supply.8
Water Rsources and a Palestinian State
The declaration of a Palestinian State with sovereign right over its natural 
resources and recognized control over the flow of water has obvious and significant 
implications for Israeli security considerations. Would a belligerent Palestine 
block divert or reduce the water supply to extort concessions from an Israeli 
government? Could a Palestinian government guarantee that the water supply 
would not be poisoned by terrorists using biological or chemical agents? Would 
a massive influx of Palestinians from other parts of the Arab world overload the 
infrastructure capacity of the Palestinian State, thereby creating the conditions of 
unsafe sanitation and outbreak of disease that would invariably impact on Israel? In 
the case of open conflict, would Israel’s water supply from the Mountain Aquifer 
diminish or cease to the extent that Israel would be forced to invade the territory 
of the new state? The creation of a Palestinian State, in light of the scarcity of 
water resources and the failure of Israel and the Palestinians to comprehensively 
begin to resolve water disputes, is likely to adversely impact on Israel’s security 
and the state of its natural resources.13
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Terrorism and a Palestinian 
State
Meyrav Wurmser
F
uture Palestinian attitudes toward terrorism stand at the forefront of regional 
and international concerns regarding the establishment of a Palestinian State. 
The question of whether or not the Palestinian community will continue 
to support terrorism relates, first and foremost, to the issue of the final status 
of the territories under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA) - namely, 
to the question of Palestinian statehood. Even should the Palestinians achieve 
an independent state, its future relationship with Israel and its engagement in, 
or prevention of, terrorist acts will be determined by three factors: the eroding 
support for Yasser Arafat, and Arafat’s need to externalize resentment toward 
his regime; the PA’s current and future relations with militant Palestinian 
Islamic organizations; and the extent to which a substantial ideological change 
toward Israel has taken place in the Palestinian side since the signing of the 
Oslo Accords.        
Will an Independent Palestinian State be Declared?
The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government concluded between 
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in September 1993 stipulated   
“a transitional period not to exceed 5 years, leading to a permanent settlement 
based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).” Following 
the Declaration of Principles, the two sides concluded partial implementation 
agreements, followed by the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, which outlined the details of the five-year transitional period, beginning with 
the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip and Jericho in 1994 and to end on May 
4, 1999. The last agreement concluded between the Israelis and the Palestinians 
was the Wye River Memorandum of October 28, 1998. Here, the two sides again 
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agreed to “immediately resume permanent status negotiations on an accelerated 
basis” and to “make a determined effort to achieve the mutual goal of reaching 
an agreement by May 4, 1999.”
Currently, the bilateral track of the talks toward an agreement is, in fact, 
nonexistent, leaving room for unilateral action by either of the sides following the 
five-year transitional period. While Israel is not threatening to take unilateral steps, 
it is not yet clear what the Palestinians will do. In recent months, many Palestinian 
officials, including Yasser Arafat himself, repeatedly assured the Palestinian people 
that upon the expiration of the agreements with Israel, they will unilaterally 
declare an independent Palestinian State. For example, Arafat’s advisor, Nabil 
Abu Radina, said in February 1999: “the fourth of May [1999] is a holy date. 
The Palestinian State is a finalized historic fact; the struggle today is not for 
the [establishment of] the State, but over its territory. The whole world knows 
it and treats us accordingly.”1
The Palestinian National Council (PNC) actually declared the establishment 
of the State of Palestine, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in Algiers in 1988, on 
the basis of the two state solution stipulated by the U.N. General Assembly in 
Resolution 181 of November 1947 (the partition resolution). This declaration 
was recognized by more than 108 states. The Palestinians say that the second 
declaration will finalize the first one, in the sense that it will consolidate the 
sovereignty of the Palestinian State over its territories.2 
The logic behind the PA’s policies is based on the premise that once the five-year 
Interim stage ends, and if no agreement has been reached on final settlement, the 
PA will be free of the inhibitions undertaken in Oslo, particularly those which 
enforce the continuity of the political and legal status quo in the West Bank and 
Gaza strip. Hence, the PA believes that after May 4, it will be free to unilaterally 
advance its national agenda. An interesting aspect of this change relates to the 
fact that the PA, which came into existence through the power of the agreements 
between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), will be replaced 
by the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.3 Such a change 
would be significant because, unlike the PA, which only represents the Palestinians 
in the territories, the PLO claims to represent all the Palestinians, including 
those in the diaspora, who insist on the right to return to their homes inside 
Israel proper.
Palestinian desire to declare a state on May 4, however, has met much American 
opposition. In early February 1999, the United States, whose friendship is crucial 
to the Palestinians, told Israeli officials that it was opposed to any unilateral action 
by either party that would contradict the principle of resolving differences through 
negotiations.4 This stand was reconfirmed by Senate and House of Representatives 
resolutions in March 1999 against a unilateral declaration of statehood by Arafat. 
This opposition was also shared by the European community, Egypt and Jordan, 
all of which were concerned that unilateral Palestinian action would help to reelect 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the May 17 elections in Israel.5 In 
light of this opposition, Arafat launched a series of international consultations in 17
an attempt to trade a postponement of the unilateral declaration of independence 
to late December 1999 for a recognition of an independent Palestinian State at 
the end of the century. He has been only partially successful. While the U.S. 
has continued to adhere to its opposition to any unilateral steps, the European 
community meeting in Berlin on March 26, 1999, declared its reaffirmation of 
“the continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination including 
the option of a state” and announced its “readiness to consider the recognition of 
a Palestinian State in due course.”6
Whatever shape the Palestinian declaration of statehood will take, and whenever 
it will take place, there is little doubt that a Palestinian State will come into being 
at least on the territories currently under PA control. The only questions remaining 
are whether the Palestinians will attempt to apply their sovereignty to areas beyond 
those agreed upon with Israel, and what Israel’s reaction will be to unilateral 
Palestinian acts. Should a violent clash break out between the Palestinians and 
Israel over this issue, the PLO will probably engage directly in hostilities against 
Israel, including a resumption of terrorist acts. This position has been echoed in 
the statements of many high-ranking PA officials; Palestinian Minister of Planning 
and International Cooperation, Nabil Sha’ath, warned that the Palestinians would 
“fight Israel if it declares war in an attempt to reoccupy Palestinian lands.”7 The 
head of the Preventative Security Apparatus in the West Bank, Jibril Rajub, 
said “...talks of Israeli incursion into PA territories is a flagrant provocation... 
we will use every means and capacity at our disposal in order to defend our 
national and military honor...”8
If, conversely, and against most assessments, Arafat chooses not to declare an 
independent Palestinian State, it is highly probable that the Hamas movement 
and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Organization will accelerate their terrorist 
activities, supported by the PA’s failure to deliver real political gains from 
the peace process.
Eroding Support for                                                            Arafat 
and its Consequences
After returning to the West Bank from Tunis, Arafat enjoyed an unprecedented 
level of support among Palestinians because he was seen as the leader who 
had brought about an Israeli withdrawal and the international recognition of 
Palestinian rights. In January 1996, Arafat was elected by a large Palestinian 
majority as President of the newly born Palestinian entity. Since that time, 
however, things have changed for Arafat. Support of his regime is on the decline, 
and he is faced with a growing and vocal opposition. Reasons for Arafat’s 
declining support include:
1.   The Corrupt Nature of the Palestinian Regime – Since its establishment, 
the PA has received $1.8 billion in foreign aid.9 This money was invested 
in an economy characterized by a system of powerful monopolies closely 18
associated with the regime. The arch monopoly is the Palestine Development 
and Investment Company (PADICO), which controls most facets of the 
Palestinian economy through subsidiaries, and whose various boards of 
directors are dominated by members of a small number of powerful families.10 
The economy as a whole is guided by Arafat’s economic advisor, Muhammad 
Rashid, who not only rules the monopolies, but also ensures that certain 
parts of their profits benefit Arafat and his closest family members and 
associates.11 Over time, the corruption has become so severe that the Palestinian 
Legislative Council appointed a special committee in 1997, which released 
an incriminating report on the PA administration. The report demanded 
that two Palestinian ministers, Nabil Sha’ath and Jamil Al- Tarifi, be ousted 
for corruption, but even after reshuffling his cabinet, Arafat ignored this 
demand.12 In recent months, public criticism of the PA’s corrupt practices 
is being voiced more openly, particularly because of the growing social gap 
between the few benefactors of the corrupt practices and the impoverished 
Palestinian masses.
2.  Arafat’s Failure to State-Build – Since the creation of the Palestinian National 
Council in 1996, Arafat has limited its role to ceremonial functions, despite 
the frequent lip service he pays to the importance of the legislature. The laws 
initiated by members of the legislature are ignored by Arafat, who prefers 
to rule by decrees. Furthermore, Arafat refuses to permit the legislature to 
check the working of the Executive. For its part, the Executive refuses to carry 
out the decisions of the judiciary. Instead, Arafat encourages the continuous 
activities of “tribal courts” (in Arabic: Mahakim ‘Ashairiyya) that reinforce 
the traditional structure of society. But the relations between the various 
branches of the government are not the only problem. Fundamentally, Arafat 
has failed to replace the traditional structure of society with the structure 
of a modern state. Such a modern structure depends on the emergence of a 
middle class, which cannot occur under the current system of monopolies. 
The traditional familial structure thus continues to play a major role in 
Palestinian society.
3.   The Role of the Security Services – Arafat rules through a host of security 
forces and mechanisms, some of which fulfill the tasks of an army, others of a 
police force, and still others of external and internal intelligence and security 
services. This multiplicity of security services, all of which act simultaneously 
and with overlapping jurisdictions, inherently exposes the Palestinian people 
to oppression. In fact, according to some reports, the ratio of Palestinian police 
to the population is among the highest in the Western world (1 policeman 
to every 50 citizens; the U.S., by comparison, has 1 policeman for every 400 
citizens).13 Since these services perform their duties according to Arafat’s 
instructions rather than the rule of law, the inevitable result is, generally 
speaking, a brutal dictatorship. The situation is exacerbated by the competition 19
and clashes between these services, which sometimes kill each other’s men as 
well as innocent civilian bystanders. Arafat, who serves as the commander-in-
chief of all the security forces, promotes this brigandage as a means to better 
control the population and preserve his regime. 
4.    Undemocratic Practices – The PA’s oppressive practices and violations 
of human rights are another cause of resentment among the Palestinian 
public. Palestinian and international human rights groups frequently report 
the Palestinian Preventive Security Services’ human rights abuses, which 
include extrajudicial punishment, the abduction of residents from their homes, 
warrantless arrests, lengthy detention without judicial scrutiny, refusal of legal 
representation, and the use of harsh torture techniques which have caused 
deaths. Agents of the Security Services conduct policing actions without any 
lawful authority, and their activities are subject to no judicial review.14 Their 
systematic human rights abuses also extend to the unlawful collection of 
taxes and the arrest of “suspected” individuals, their torture, and demands 
of payment for their release.15 
5.   Failure to Meet Popular Expectations – Since the beginning of the Oslo 
negotiations, Arafat has promised his people that this process will fulfill the 
national Palestinian goals: an independent Palestinian State with Jerusalem as 
its capital and the right of return of all Palestinian refugees to their homes. For 
some time, the initial Palestinian achievements (the Israeli withdrawals, the 
establishment of the PA, and the international support which the Palestinians 
enjoyed) created the impression that further accomplishments were to follow. 
But in the last year, there has been a growing Palestinian realization that 
the final status talks, if and when they take place, will not bring about 
the achievement of these goals. Arafat is more frequently speaking of the 
availability of other options, and of the need to continue the Palestinian 
national struggle. This has become a major source of public disappointment 
and disapproval of the PA which, in turn, has translated into growing support 
for the Islamic opposition groups.
Arafat’s declining popularity was evident, for example, in the March 1999 student 
council elections of several Palestinian universities. In these elections, significant 
because they are widely seen as a reflection of Palestinian public opinion, the Fatah 
pro-Arafat blocs consistently lost to the Islamic blocs affiliated with the Hamas 
movement. This was true in both Islamic and secular universities, and points to 
a growing sense of disapproval with Arafat in the Palestinian street. The student 
opposition to Fatah was expressed in the election campaigns, which concentrated on 
what the pro-Hamas students called the “dual oppression”- namely, the oppression 
of the Palestinian people by both Israel and the PA.16 The very comparison of 
the PA to Israel, which many Palestinians still view as the archenemy, points to 
the deepening degree of alienation that many Palestinians feel toward Arafat and 20
the Authority. Moreover, the student party platforms, which were critical of the 
security services for their human rights violations and of Arafat for his failure to 
fulfill his promises, further testified to the decreasing popularity of the Palestinian 
leadership among its population.
As Arafat’s popularity declines, he is likely, like many other totalitarian leaders, 
to externalize the conflict in order to regain public support. An early sign of this 
trend was evident in Arafat’s renewal of anti-Israel incitement in late March 1999. 
Facing growing American pressures not to declare a state on May 4, the Palestinian 
leader, who since the signing of the Wye River accords has generally refrained 
from using violent anti-Israel language, declared to a Fatah crowd in a ceremony 
commemorating the battle of Al-Karameh: “Let the far and the near know on 
this occasion that the Fatah movement is ready to fight battles like Al-Karameh 
daily, if anyone tries to diminish our legitimate rights and our right to declare 
a state.”17 If Arafat’s political fortunes continue to deteriorate, he is likely to 
rally his population against Israel and/or resort to terrorism. This will become 
particularly true if, following a peaceful May 4, he is only able to present his 
people with minimal political achievements, further strengthening the Islamist 
opposition to his regime.        
Relations with                                                                                                                                                         
Militant Islamic Organizations
According to the premises of Oslo, as well as the subsequent accords, in return 
for territory, the PA was to fight Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in order to provide 
Israel with the security it required. But the Palestinian leadership did not comply, 
viewing Hamas as a national opposition rather than a terrorist group. Even the 
Izz Al-Din Al-Quasam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, are not, in Arafat’s eyes, 
a terrorist group.18 Arafat’s animated public speeches resonate compassion for 
Sheik Ahmad Yassin, Hamas’ leader.19 Yahya ‘Ayyash, the Hamas mastermind 
of various bombings in Israel, nicknamed ‘the Engineer,’ has also been extolled 
by Arafat in his public speeches, with ‘Ayyash called “a sacred martyr,” like all 
of Hamas’ fallen heroes.20
The very notion of fighting Hamas is unacceptable to Arafat, and is perceived by 
him as an Israeli plot to push the Palestinian people into internal strife and civil war 
between the PLO and Hamas (a trap that - needless to say - Arafat vows never to 
fall into).21 As for Hamas, its leadership made it absolutely clear from the moment 
Arafat entered Gaza, that they would not seek to topple the PA. All they asked for 
was to preserve their right to continue the jihad against the enemy.
It is no wonder, therefore, that Arafat has never outlawed either Hamas or its 
military wing.22 In fact, Arafat has attempted to entice Hamas to join the PA, 
with a moderate degree of success.23 Arafat has also (successfully) encouraged 
Hamas activists to create a political party. The “Salvation Party” has been acting 
as a Hamas front for almost two years, and its publication, Al Risala, appears 21
undisturbed every week. Other Hamas activists were encouraged by Arafat to run 
for PA Council elections, and five of them won seats with Arafat’s support - at the 
expense of his own Fatah candidates.
On several occasions the PA has acted forcefully against Hamas. This was the 
case after the 1996 series of suicide bombings which halted the peace process, 
and also after Israel halted withdrawals under the Wye Agreement for lack of 
compliance by the Palestinian Authority. However, arrests of Hamas activists are 
always temporary at best, since the PA has adopted a “revolving door” policy, and 
is quick to release the activists it arrests.
More typical of the relationship between the PA and Hamas is an agreement 
signed in Cairo on December 21, 1995 by Arafat’s deputy and confidant, Head 
of the Palestinian National Council Salim Za’anoun, and Hamas head of the 
Politburo Khalid Mash’al.24 Under this agreement, Hamas consented “not to 
embarrass the PA,” and was permitted to act against Israel only from areas not 
under the control of the PA.25 Through this agreement, Arafat sought to guarantee 
a controlled and paced degree of violence via Hamas, through which he intended 
to pressure Israel without directly entangling the PLO or endangering his relations 
with the United States.
   Currently, the PA maintains a consistent relationship of both conflict and 
cooperation with Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In the short term there can be conflict 
or competition between the various Palestinian factions, while in the long-term 
the PA and Hamas share a common understanding that achieving Palestinian goals 
requires national unity against Israel.  
Has There been an                                                                                                                   
Ideological Change Toward Israel?
A central aspect that will determine whether or not a Palestinian State will use 
terrorism against Israel has to do with the attitude toward the Jewish State in 
Palestinian society. From its early days, Palestinian nationalism centered around 
anti-Israel feelings and calls for violence against its Jewish citizens. This has 
become particularly true since the formation of the PLO, whose stated goal was 
the destruction of Zionism and the State of Israel, in 1964. Through the Oslo 
negotiations, the organization was asked to change its covenant calling for armed 
struggle against Israel, because peace required a Palestinian ideological shift.
Even after steps have been taken to change the covenant, the question of 
Palestinian attitudes toward Israel deserves examination, because a nation’s psyche 
extends beyond its formal documents. A true ideological change must stem from a 
redefinition of stated Palestinian national goals - from the destruction of Israel to 
coexistence with it. This change should be expressed through peaceful statements 
by its leaders and opinion makers, as well as through the way Palestinians educate 
their youth. If this change of heart has not taken place, and if Palestinian society 
continues to be fundamentally mobilized against Israel, a renewed outbreak of 22
Palestinian violence against Israel is but a question of time.
Since the commencement of the Oslo Accords, Arafat has continually presented 
the negotiations to his own people as a temporary agreement, and not as a 
lasting peace. He has consistently based and legitimized his reconciliation on 
two important precedents: the contemporary ‘plan of stages’ and the ancient 
Hudaybiya agreement. 
The ‘Plan of Stages’ – Palestinian officials on all levels have stressed time and 
again their commitment to the 1974 “ten points plan,” known as “the plan of 
stages.” This plan, adopted by the PLO following the 1973 war, was a way of 
demonstrating its willingness to create a parallel political track to its traditional 
path of armed struggle as a means of achieving its goals. The plan, which 
was supported by the PLO’s central faction, Fatah, accepted an independent 
Palestinian entity in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza as a stage in a longer process 
leading to the creation of a Palestinian State in all of Palestine.26 No substantial 
change in the PLO’s ideology has occurred since then.  Even on September 
13, 1993, the day of the signing of the Oslo accords, Arafat gave a speech to 
his people in which he explained the Oslo process in terms of the 1974 ‘plan 
of stages.’ It provided the context through which he wanted his people to 
understand this peace agreement - as a merely temporary settlement leading to 
the realization of the Palestinian dream.
The Hudaybiya Agreement  – Time and again Arafat has also compared the 
Oslo Accords to the Hudaybiya agreement signed by the Prophet Mohammed 
with the tribe of Qureish, which has become the legal Islamic precedent for 
any temporary agreement between Muslims and their enemies. In a speech to 
a Fatah conference on November 16, 1998, Arafat said: “we chose the ‘peace 
of the brave’ out of faith in [the conduct of] the prophet in the Hudaybiya 
agreement. We adopted this agreement, the ‘agreement of the brave’... The 
Palestinian revolution is a great revolution. Let the far and the near know 
that the Palestinian rifle is ready and we will aim it if they try to prevent us 
from praying in Jerusalem.”27 
Since the 1993 Oslo Accords did not change the basic tenets of the PLO’s ideology, 
anti-Israel incitement remains a fixture in the statements of leaders on all levels. It is 
also present on the popular level in newspaper articles, television shows, and in the 
way Palestinian children are educated, and has not ceased even after the 1998 Wye 
River Accords.28 Similarly, the PLO’s anti-Western ideology has not abated, and the 
United States has continued to be portrayed as arrogant and imperialistic. In particular, 
American policy toward Iraq has created a backlash from the PLO. In a speech given 
on behalf of President Arafat, Secretary General of the Palestinian Authority Presidency 
Al-Tayyeb Abd Al-Rahim, identified with Iraq, stating that: “American aggression 
against Iraq is aggression against Arab national security and against Iraq’s sovereignty 
and that of the Arab people...”29 Other American efforts in the region, such as the strikes 23
on Sudan and Afghanistan, have also elicited a strong reaction from the Palestinian 
media. In Al-Manar, Isma’il ‘Ajwa condemned American actions, stating: “this is 
the age of American hatred, the age of bullying and barbarity.”30 The Palestinians 
also continue to distrust and malign the intentions of the United States. Palestinian 
researcher and historian Ahmad Sudqi Al-Dujani, in an interview by the PA daily, 
compared the conduct of the Clinton administration toward the Palestinians to that of 
18th and 19th Century Americans toward the American Indians, stating that “the Wye 
Agreement expresses the view of ‘settlement’ common amongst Americans.”31 These 
statements point to a continued distrust of, and antagonism toward, the United States, 
despite its role as the broker of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.
 Conclusions
This review of internal Palestinian developments points to the fact that a Palestinian 
State, if and when declared, is likely to engage in terrorism against Israel, due to 
both the regime’s political necessities, and the continued ideological motivations 
which mobilize the Palestinian polity against Israel. The changes which occurred in 
the condition of the Palestinian people as a result of the Oslo process - from living 
under an Israeli occupation to living under autonomous self-rule, and the prospects 
of moving toward an advanced level of political sovereignty in the framework 
of an independent Palestinian State - are insufficient to end the violent aspects 
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The political structure which came into being 
in the territories under the control of the PLO is similar to other undemocratic 
regimes in the Middle East. Like them, it is bound to suffer instability and resort 
to external conflicts as a means of self-preservation. 
The destabilizing effects of continued terrorist activity will affect not only 
the security of Israel, but also that of neighboring states, and finally, American 
interests in the region as well. The Palestinian government remains mired in 
anti-Israel and anti-American ideology, as well as a policy of long-term cooperation 
with Islamic movements. The failure of the peace process negotiations to alter 
the ideology of the PA make it likely that terrorism, motivated by anti-Israel 
and anti-American sentiment, will remain a continued obstacle to American 
interests in the Middle East.24
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The PLO and the Future of 
Jordan
David Wurmser  
T
hough not always understood by Israel, the West as a whole, or even by 
itself at times, Jordan represents an antithesis to the violent politics of revo-
lution that have gripped the Middle East and plagued Israel since Nasser’s 
coup in Egypt in the early 1950s. As a result of its political character, Jordan 
has not only traditionally been a quiet neighbor to Israel, a friendly state to the 
West, and an irritant to Israel’s most determined enemies – such as Syria and the 
PLO – it has also gradually, since 1970, become Israel’s strategic partner, along 
with Turkey. Jordan’s history over the decades has been marked by Hashemite 
attempts, and retreats from those attempts, to wean themselves away from PLO 
domination. As a result, the current upheaval in Jordan, and the growing power of 
the PLO, will have profound strategic ramifications for Jordan’s long-term future. 
Jordan will either deteriorate into another Lebanon – a vortex drawing in and 
being swallowed by the competitive energies of its neighbors – or it will resist this 
fate through resolutely confronting the PLO.
The Origins of Jordan’s Strategic Role
For most of this century, Arab politics have been torn by a rivalry between the 
old, traditional establishment and a new, revolutionary upheaval. This tension 
first surfaced during the great Arab revolt against the Ottomans in World War I. 
The revolt was led by the Hashemite Sherif Husayn of Mecca, a symbol of the old, 
traditional establishment of Islam and the Arabs, but the rank and file of the revolt 
included a new revolutionary group of Arab officers, many of whom were schooled 
in the West or in Western schools in the Middle East. After the war, with the 
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common enemy of the Ottoman Empire removed, these two trends within Arab 
society entered a conflict which continues to the present day. 
In particular, since the middle of the last century, radical efforts in both 
Europe and the Middle East have continuously challenged traditional society, and 
utopian, statist, and arrogant politics have replaced a more liberal, decentralized, 
and humble form of politics. In the Middle East, the revolutionary impulse has 
dominated. As a result, the prevailing form of government in the Middle East 
has been, and continues to be, republican tyranny. The violence, instability, anti-
Americanism, and anti-Zionism which grips Arab politics emerges neither from 
lingering resentment from the colonial era, nor from the “exotic” or “primitive” 
nature of the Arab world. It emerges from the Arab world’s embrace – be it in 
secular or religious garb – of a great and deadly aberration of Western thought 
prevalent in this century. In particular, Arab politics is haunted by utopian, 
tyrannical attempts to radically transform man through totalitarian despotism – 
attempts which are easily exploited by cynical, ambitious men to annihilate political 
opponents, achieve absolute power and wage war on traditional elites who stand in 
their way. Such angry and revolutionary politics have brought the politics of mass 
murder to the Middle East, as despots erase opposing factions, ethnic groups, sects, 
elites and all other forms of diffused power and civil society. 
The Hashemites and Jordan                                                                                           
versus Radical Pan-Arab Nationalism
Jordan, however, resisted the neighborhood’s trendy statist tyranny and desisted 
from attempting to homogenize Arab society. Unlike its neighbors (such as 
Saddam, Assad, Nasser, Qaddafi, Khomeini, and Arafat) Jordan has tolerated 
its tribalism and traditional divisions in society, and its leaders have emphasized 
individual rights and dignity, rather than the subordination of its individuals 
to the requirements of the collective, as the basis for politics in the Arab world. 
Indeed, its embrace of the idea that robust nations emerge from coalitions of strong 
communities, rather than from tyrannical, destructive efforts at homogenizing 
societies, is the most potent idea Jordan offers other Arab nations. Such ideas, 
however, cannot be tolerated by the region’s radical rulers; they threaten them by 
shaking the very legitimacy of their regimes. As a result, they invite enmity, fuming 
envy, sneers and fears among the region’s totalitarian despots. 
This was a matter of great concern for Jordan, and especially for King Hussein. 
From personal experience, Hussein knew that this enmity would assume a violent 
and determined form. His grandfather had been gunned down before his eyes 
by a Palestinian nationalist. His Hashemite relative, King Faisal II of Iraq, was 
murdered in 1958 as Iraq became engulfed in one of the many regional revolutions 
inspired by Egypt’s Nasser and his violent brand of radical pan-Arab nationalism. 
And the Hashemite regent of Iraq had been deposed by a coup during World War 
II by the radical pan-Arab nationalist Rashid al-Gaylani, only to be reinstalled by 29
direct British and British Jewish Legion intervention.
These personal experiences, and the knowledge that many in his realm, as well 
as a number of neighboring leaders, relished the prospect of helping bring him to 
a similar end, shaped much of King Hussein’s politics. He ruled a nation smaller 
and more barren of resources than any of its neighbors in a turbulent and brazenly 
competitive region. Iraq is to the east, Syria to the north, the Saudis – who are 
wary of the Hashemites’ claims to their ancestral home in Mecca from which the 
Saudis had driven them – to the south, Israel to the west, and the Palestinians 
within. King Hussein’s survival, and the continuation of Jordan’s independence 
itself, could thus not be secured by raw power or easily found wealth. In response 
to this challenge, Jordan has learned to maneuver adeptly on a tactical level. More 
importantly, it has also accepted a Western, then Israeli, and more recently a 
Turkish-Israeli, strategic umbrella to survive.
Jordanian Strategic Responses
Throughout its history, Jordan has responded to radical pan-Arab nationalism in 
two ways. At times, it has sought to appease the threat and attempted to purchase 
its narrow security through championing Arab nationalist causes, such as on the 
Palestinian issue. At other times, it has placed itself at the forefront of rejecting 
radical pan-Arab nationalism, and turned to non-Arab actors, such as Britain, 
the United States, Israel and Turkey, for help. Paradoxically, it has been far more 
secure when it has embarked on the latter course, and it has nearly been destroyed 
numerous times by embracing the former.
King Hussein assumed the throne of Jordan with full constitutional powers on 
his eighteenth birthday in May 1953. It was an age of revolution; the previous 
year, Gamal Abdel Nasser had seized power in Egypt, touting a radical pan-Arab 
nationalist movement. The first challenge to Hussein’s reign came soon after 
coronation. Nasser forced Britain’s expulsion from Egypt in 1954, and later that 
year a pro-Nasserite revolt erupted in Algeria to force France’s removal. Nasser 
also pressed King Hussein to expel foreign forces from Jordan, knowing that much 
of Jordan’s regime rested on the armed forces, which were commanded by senior 
British officers. Their withdrawal would leave Jordan vulnerable, but leaving them 
in place would have opened Hussein up to the accusation that he was a colonial, 
pro-Western agent. Hussein buckled under the pressure, and in March 1956, 
replaced the senior British officers under Sir John Bagot Glubb. 
Nasser’s agents were quick to try to fill the vacuum. In March 1957, King 
Hussein foiled an attempted coup. King Faisal II, Hussein’s Hashemite relative, and 
his main advisor, Nuri as-Said, were overthrown in Iraq in 1958 – in part because 
they underestimated the insatiable nature of the threat from pro-Nasserite officers 
in the military. The Iraqi revolution triggered a similar revolt by pro-Nasserite 
elements in Jordan’s army in July 1958 which, though crushed, forced Hussein 
to request the intervention of British and American troops. The entry of U.S. 
and British troops into Jordan and nearby Lebanon broke the momentum of 30
revolutionary fervor which had been triggered by the Egyptian Revolution and 
emboldened from 1952-1958 by the defensive response of the region’s monarchs, 
including King Hussein.
The affairs of Jordan, and even of the entire Middle East, calmed temporarily 
after 1958. Jordan receded as a target for Nasser and his followers, in part because 
of Nasser’s entanglement in a difficult war in Yemen and occupation with an 
intrigue-filled trilateral relationship with Syria and Iraq (both of whom had come 
under radical, pan-Arab nationalist control and were trying to form a union). 
Moreover, Jordan believed it coopted some of the revolutionary fervor, or perhaps 
preempted some of Nasser’s hostility, by tolerating the gradual buildup within it 
of one of Nasser’s causes celebres – the Palestine Liberation Organization. This 
tolerance slowly dragged Jordan into the crossfire of the Arab-Israel conflict. 
Syria, in union with Egypt at the time, used Palestinian factions to launch terror 
attacks on Israel from the Jordanian-controlled West Bank. This in turn forced 
Israel to retaliate against Jordan. But the real danger from the PLO, as much a 
tentacle of Nasser’s revolutionary Egypt as it was a Palestinian-based indigenous 
movement, was internal to Jordan.
Turning Toward Confronting Nasser
In 1965, King Hussein’s government appointments signaled a turn away from 
attempts at appeasing the Nasserite wave which, in large part because of its 
miserable setback in Yemen, had lost some of its luster. The new Prime Minister, 
Wasfi al-Tal, was known for his opposition to Nasser’s Egypt, the new Baathist 
Syrian government, and to the growing power and influence of the PLO among 
Palestinians. In contrast to Tal, the previous Prime Minister, Bahajat al-Talhouni, 
had been known – apart for being famously corrupt – for his sympathies toward 
Nasser’s Egypt, Ahmad Shukairi and Yasser Arafat’s PLO, and Egypt’s close 
partner, Baathist Syria.1
In 1967, matters took a more ominous turn. During a particularly serious Israeli 
retaliation into Samu (biblical Eshtemoa) in the West Bank in 1967, Israeli and 
Jordanian forces waged nearly a day of pitched battles. King Hussein saw the 
ever-growing autonomy of pan-Arab nationalist forces, in the guise of PLO factions, 
operating in his realm, ostensibly “continuing the struggle for Palestine,” but in 
reality using violence – and Hussein’s inability to cope with Israeli retaliations – 
to demand a free hand in establishing areas of activity under sole PLO control, 
and to discredit and weaken Hussein’s monarchy enough to eventually challenge it 
directly. The PLO’s Fedayeen had also begun, despite Hussein’s efforts to tolerate 
and champion their cause, to constantly and brazenly interfere in internal Jordanian 
questions, to threaten and stir up trouble against politicians known for their 
antipathy to Nasser, the PLO, and Syria, and to encourage, in part through Egyptian 
help, pro-PLO Jordanian politicians, foremost among them former Prime Minister 
Bahajat al-Talhouni. The PLO also began to conduct a series of terror attacks in 31
Amman, Jerusalem, and other major Jordanian cities to further create a climate 
of instability.
Realizing the implacable threat he faced, King Hussein and Prime Minister 
Wasfi al-Tal shifted to a policy of open confrontation with Nasser and his allies, 
including the PLO, in early 1967. Hussein closed PLO offices across Jordan and 
de-recognized the pro-Nasser Arab Republic of Yemen. In February, Jordan recalled 
its ambassador from Cairo, recognized West Germany (which it had been forced 
to de-recognize under pressure from Nasser in 1965) and used the dissolution of 
parliament to decree a new set of laws closing pro-PLO newspapers. 
The 1967 War derailed this initiative. In May 1967, after a series of clashes 
along Israel’s northern border (and after the Soviet Union falsely accused Israel 
of preparing an assault on Syria), Egypt declared that it would defend all Arabs 
attacked by Israel and began mobilizing its army in the Sinai peninsula for a war 
which, Nasser claimed, would destroy the Jewish State. Egypt also closed the Gulf of 
Eilat by placing artillery along the Tiran Straits in Sharm ash-Sheikh, the southern 
tip of the Sinai. The military buildup in the Sinai and the blockade of Eilat was 
tantamount to a declaration of war. Israel at the time was largely reliant on Iranian 
oil, which came from the Persian Gulf and had to be unloaded at Eilat. Israel’s only 
other port, Ashdod, was in the Mediterranean and cut off from eastern trade as a 
result of Egypt’s continued blockade of Israeli traffic through the Suez Canal since 
1956. As a result, blockading Eilat was tantamount to a suppression of oil flow to 
Israel. Moreover, squeezing Eilat introduced another strategic problem. Israel feared 
strategic encirclement; it had only enough troops to fight in sequence along a number 
of fronts. If Jordan physically touched Egypt, which only Eilat’s continued existence 
prohibited, and if Jordan joined the effort against Israel, then Egyptian troops could 
move freely between fronts, leaving Israel in a very difficult strategic posture. 
By late May, the Tiran Straits were cut and Egypt focused much of its mobilization 
near Eilat. As Israel watched anxiously, Jordan came under heavy pressure from 
Nasser to join the effort. Israel, both directly and through the United States, 
implored Jordan not to intervene, but Jordan, fearing that it could not withstand 
any continued pressure, had by May 30 already turned over command of its armed 
forces to its radical, pan-Arab nationalist nemesis, Egypt. Jordan allowed Egyptian 
infantry to be placed on the West Bank near Latrun, the closest point in the West 
Bank to Egyptian forces also massing in the northern areas of the Gaza Strip. This 
set the stage for one of Jordan’s biggest mistakes. When war erupted on June 5, and 
despite continued Israeli requests not to intervene, Jordan began shelling Jerusalem 
and the southern Galilee region in Israel, as well as allowing Iraqi troops, also 
commanded by a radical pan-Arab nationalist government, to move through it to the 
West Bank. They also allowed the PLA – the military wing of the PLO – to mobilize 
and take positions in the West Bank. Late on June 5, Jordanian troops began a thrust 
against Jerusalem and Jordan became a full partner in the disastrous war. They lost 
Jerusalem and the entire West Bank in the next days.
At the root of Jordan’s defeat was a subtle, but very important strategic shift. 
On the eve of the war, King Hussein had succumbed to the temptation to co-opt 32
and preempt the wave of radical, pan-Arab nationalist sentiment on the issue of 
Palestine in order to survive, rather than turn to external allies for help. That strategic 
shift, however, did nothing to calm the pan-Arab nationalist pressures on him. In 
fact, it had only served to derail the efforts launched prior to the war to bring the 
PLO’s fedayeen under control.
Toward Black September
After the 1967 War, Nasser sought a more indirect approach. He launched the 
War of Attrition, an intense but stationary war that lasted for three years. This 
war was waged along both the Syrian and Egyptian borders, but in order to wage 
it along the Jordanian border, the Egyptians needed the services of the PLO, 
since Jordan had no taste for following up its 1967 defeat with provocations that 
could bring Israeli forces into nearby Amman. Thus, the pattern which emerged 
in 1954 reappeared: radical, pan-Arab nationalist forces, this time in the shape 
of the PLO, continued to build up in Jordan through King Hussein’s tolerance – 
in part because he hoped it would help him avert animosity from his nemeses – 
and continued to wage a War of Attrition on Israel, which frequently entangled 
Jordan in intense battles against its better judgment. Similarly, Jordan accepted the 
emplacement of some Iraqi troops, now under a new Baathist regime, in northern 
Jordan, from which they harassed Israel. Moreover, under the Iraqi umbrella, the 
PLO consolidated its control in a defined geographic area, and began to challenge 
the authority of the Hashemite government there. This pattern was to repeat in 
the PLO’s later behavior in Lebanon, in large part because the Sunni Lebanese 
encouraged pan-Arab nationalist domination of their country in the hopes that it 
would tilt the internal balance of power toward them. They were assisted in this task 
by direct Syrian interference and eventually the Sunni PLO’s massive intrusion. In 
essence, Jordan was becoming the battleground of the War of Attrition waged by 
outsiders – a fate which eventually befell Lebanon a decade later.
By 1970, the PLO had built its position in Jordan into a formidable conventional 
army which could credibly challenge the independence of Jordan. In summer 
1970, it felt it was ready to challenge King Hussein and demanded, as Nasser had 
done in 1954-1956, that Hussein dismiss a number of key commanders known for 
their suspicions of the PLO from the Jordanian army, upon which the King’s reign 
depended. After Israel crushed the Egyptian army in a series of massive air raids 
in August 1970, the War of Attrition ended, leaving Egypt licking its wounds and 
relieving some of the pressure on other Arabs to wage war on Israel. By September, 
the stage was set for a Jordanian-PLO confrontation.
Black September, which is what the Jordanian-PLO war came to be known, was 
arguably the King’s finest moment and act of greatest statesmanship, setting the 
tone for the kingdom for 20 years. In September 1970, the PLO – which had been 
allowed to operate freely from Jordan as a guest of the king – turned on its host 
and tried to destroy the Hashemite monarchy. Fighting erupted on 17 September, 33
and by the next day Syria joined in the fray and sent two battalions across Jordan’s 
northern border to help Arafat crush King Hussein. Jordan responded with a 
key decision: it again turned to the United States and Britain for help. Neither, 
however, had the assets in place to help, so Israel was asked to intervene on Jordan’s 
behalf. Hussein quickly accepted Israeli power as a strategic asset. Israel’s air force 
threatened Syria into retreat and its army mobilized along the Jordan valley, freeing 
up Jordan’s army to crush the PLO, which it did ruthlessly.
This strategic decision, more than any other act ever done by Hussein, not 
only protected his kingdom from certain destruction, but allowed it to become a 
two-decade oasis of stability. After 1970, Jordan continued to realize the advantages 
of tapping Israel’s power, understanding how much his most feared nemeses, the 
PLO and Syria, stood weakened by it. King Hussein understood Israel’s utility 
in maintaining internal security by co-managing the Palestinian community on 
both banks of the Jordan River and in extending a strategic umbrella vis-a-vis 
other regional powers, such as Syria. 
After 1970 – Jordan’s Drift Backward
In retrospect, from the change in government to Wasfi al-Tal in 1965 onwards, it 
is clear that on the eve of the 1967 war, Hussein had embarked on a counterattack 
on Arab nationalism – a counterattack which was derailed by the war, but resumed 
soon thereafter – culminating in Black September. It was that counterattack, and 
the serious drubbing Arab nationalism received at Israel’s hands, that brought 
Jordan and Israel the 20 years of stability that both enjoyed vis-a-vis each other and 
the Palestinians. It signaled a formula for regional stability: cooperation by Jordan 
with the West against radical pan-Arab nationalism. But as Black September 
drifted further into memory, King Hussein again shifted his strategy – slowly, 
incrementally and subtly, but very significantly. He again tried to co-opt and 
preempt the pressures on him, even at the expense of the Israeli (and American) 
strategic umbrella from which he enjoyed protection. By 1990, things were again 
spinning out of control for Jordan, in large part because of the key strategic 
mistakes it had made in the late 1980s with respect to the PLO and securing 
internal financial independence.
After 1988, King Hussein seemed no longer willing to admit publicly, or even 
understand privately, the extent to which his continued survival and insulation 
from dangerous enemies was no longer a function of his adept maneuvering, but of 
Israel’s growing power. Hussein’s severing of ties to the West Bank in 1988 was the 
first of two crucial mistakes. Until 1988, most of the West Bank’s infrastructure 
– from schools and services to Mosques – were under Jordanian administration, 
as they had been before 1967. Disbursing so many services and money ensured 
Jordan’s constant involvement in, and influence over, West Bank affairs, as well as 
allowing Israel to administer the territory with minimal day-to-day interference. 
In July 1988, King Hussein suddenly renounced all ties to the territories, though 
later he continued to provide some administrative functions, such as the Waqf, 34
or religious trust council. 
This move amounted to a reconsideration of his Black September decision 
to seek Israel’s protection against the relentless challenge of radical-pan Arab 
nationalism. King Hussein concluded that satisfying Palestinian nationalist 
ambitions would deflate the pressures on him from that camp – a dubious 
proposition, since their antipathy emanated from the nature of his regime, not his 
stand on Israel. Whatever the motivation, this act disrupted the solid construct of 
Israeli-Jordanian cooperation upon which the stability of both Jordan and Israel 
rested. Most importantly, it left Israel with little choice but eventually to deal 
directly with the PLO – a move which led to the current Oslo process that has 
become as much a threat to King Hussein’s realm as it is to Israel.
The King’s 1988 shift was highlighted by a change in his treatment of pro-
Jordanian Palestinians in the West Bank. The Palestinian papers, an-Nahar and 
Akhbar al-Balad, had been set up in the 1980s under Jordan’s encouragement in 
large part to help bring a pro-Jordanian perspective to the news and information 
Palestinians were receiving. Their very existence under Israeli rule, in contrast to 
the barred pro-PLO papers, was understood by many Palestinians as an indication 
of Israel’s preferences as well. Eventually, however, Jordan lost interest in these 
projects, leaving the papers vulnerable. When Arafat entered the West Bank 
territories in 1994-1995, one of his first acts was to shut down an-Nahar and 
Akhbar al-Balad.2 Jordan failed to respond, just as it failed to respond when 
Arafat suddenly restricted the free movement of a number of pro-Jordanian 
Palestinians in the West Bank and barred them altogether from traveling to 
Jordan.3 This passivity, as well as Israel’s acquiescence, was read by Palestinians 
as an indication of Jordanian and Israeli policy, which encouraged them to 
support Arafat. This was a subtle but far-reaching decision that limited Jordan’s 
long-term options.
Similarly, King Hussein failed to support other figures in the late 1980s who 
were attempting to establish an independent financial and trade base for the 
Hashemites. Much of Jordan’s financial foundation rested on two banks owned 
by pro-PLO Palestinian interests: the Cairo-Amman Bank and the Arab Bank. 
Hussein brought outsiders to Jordan to help establish a new bank to crack the 
Palestinian monopoly, but when members of the banking structure, with support 
from Saddam Hussein, coalesced to bring the effort down, King Hussein failed to 
protect those he had brought to Amman to help him. This too was a subtle but 
far-reaching decision that limited Jordan’s future options.
The Gulf War
These decisions positioned Jordan for its second blunder: the 1990-1991 war 
with Iraq. The 1991 crisis with Saddam Hussein represented a serious blow to 
the radical pan-Arab movement which had plagued the region for decades. But 
the 1991 Desert Storm war represented its death throes, as the foundation of 
the radical pan-Arab challenge crumbled just as the United States challenged 35
its flag-bearer. 
This could have been Jordan’s finest moment. Radical pan-Arab nationalism 
was dying, and Arabs knew it. Jordan’s weak position, which made it susceptible 
to the dangerous currents of Arab politics and lay behind Hussein’s cautiousness, 
had suddenly yielded to a circumstance loaded with great potential. The tide 
in Arab politics had turned. Its society, devastated by ideologies, specifically 
pan-Arab nationalism, direly needed a conservative restoration to avoid endemic 
anarchy. Jordan, which retained rather than assaulted its ties to the past, could 
have asserted itself as an alternative model of governance for Arab nations ruined 
by their revolutionary delusions. 
King Hussein missed the significance of this moment. Instead of turning 
his 35-year defensive struggle into an offensive (with superpower support and 
regional acquiescence) against radical pan-Arab nationalism as a dominant political 
ideology, he bowed to the force Saddam Hussein represented. In 1991, King 
Hussein repeated the same mistake he had made in 1967, siding with the very 
forces which would eventually try to consume him.
His failure to support the coalition against Saddam, as well as his decision to 
sever his ties to the Palestinians in the West Bank in 1988, haunted him later.   
Jordan was isolated. He watched helplessly as Syria and others asserted their 
increasing interests in Iraq, which all viewed as a limping, terminal regime after the 
Gulf War. And Israel, consumed by the Intifada and seeking to extricate itself from 
the morass, began to turn toward the PLO for help. Israel’s policies in the peace 
process, by empowering the PLO in the West Bank and by offering territorial 
concessions to Syria, upset the Jordanian-Israeli relationship and compromised 
Jordan’s position in its rivalries with the PLO and Syria. Jordan was alone, tied to 
the sinking ship of Iraq and dangerous developments among the Palestinians, who 
still formed a large majority in Jordan. Moreover, the demise of Iraq’s economy and 
trade left Jordan economically damaged and at odds with surrounding nations that 
could have served as Iraq’s replacement in the Jordanian economy. King Hussein 
was pulled along by events, and had lost most of his ability to work with Israel to 
help shape developments in a more favorable direction.
The Watershed Now Facing Jordan
The threat to Jordan posed by the PLO has continued, and even escalated, since 
the end of the Gulf War. Arafat, Iraq’s Saddam, and Syria’s Assad have grasped 
Jordan’s increased isolation and weakness and together moved to undermine the 
Jordanian regime and foment civil war. 
There is currently a broad, quadrilateral rapprochement under way between 
Syria, Iran, the PLO and Iraq. The PLO stands most visibly, or at least candidly, 
as the vanguard of this diplomatic effort. The PLO remains closely aligned with 
Saddam Hussein, with whom Jordan has entered a dangerous competition after 
trying to topple the Baghdad regime from August 1995. In late 1997, the PLO’s 
leader, Yasser Arafat, called for the formation of new “eastern front” that would 36
include Iran, Iraq, the PLO and Syria. Its purpose, he stated, was to challenge not 
only Israel, but Turkey as well.4 More worrisome, since it illustrates a regional 
trend, is the harsh, Cold War, anti-American stance embraced by the Palestinian 
Authority as it moves in line with Saddam’s rhetoric. For example, Arafat evoked 
provocative Cold War imagery by resuming his praise for the long-dead Sandinista 
revolution in Nicaragua as the model for the Palestinian revolution.5 In fact, some 
of the most vitriolic public incitement in the region against the United States 
comes from the PLO-appointed and funded Mufti of Jerusalem, Ikrama Sabri, and 
is broadcast over the Palestinian Authority’s television.6 Much of the rhetoric is in 
support for Saddam’s regime in its confrontation with the United States. The PLO 
also provides material support to Saddam by hunting down Iraqi opposition figures 
and using its facilities (including its embassy) in Iraq to hide Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction plans and materials safely out of reach of UNSCOM inspectors.7 In 
turn, Saddam rewarded Arafat by attempting to send him $100 million in October 
1997.8 In July 1997, Saddam candidly outlined how he conceives of the Palestinian 
Authority as a strategic asset in his conflict with Israel.9
Ultimately, King Hussein’s attempts since 1988 to emphasize Jordan’s 
“distinctness” from Palestinian identity have not worked, and it is evident that 
the assumption that the PLO has abandoned its long-term vision of controlling 
Jordan is wrong.10 On February 12, Arafat announced in Hebron that he would 
favor a “union of Palestine and Jordan,” which are twin brothers.11
This problem is compounded by the fact that the bulk of Jordan’s financial 
world is still dominated by pro-PLO banks, the powerful Cairo-Amman Bank 
and the Arab Bank respectively. In fact, the West Bank’s economy has been 
largely subordinated by its family-dominated monopolies, especially PADICO, 
the Palestinian Development and Investment Company - frequently at the expense 
of Jordanian economic interests. 
Unless Jordan soon checks these corrupt but potent trends – a task which 
demands a strong and energetic king – the Oslo process may yet position the 
PLO to swallow the Hashemite Kingdom. So far, it is unclear whether Abdullah 
will follow his father’s policy. Abdullah – who still upholds the kingdom’s 
restrictive press laws – has allowed the PLO to publish and sell its papers in 
Jordan for the first time since 1967.12 He has also allowed Palestinian TV to 
broadcast a show once a month on Jordanian TV channels.13 In fact, Jordan 
has increasingly moved from a policy of confrontation to one of appeasement 
in relation to the new regional strategic grouping. On February 10, The Times 
of London reported that, according to Arab papers, King Abdullah told Iraq’s 
vice president, Taha Mohiddin Maruf, that “Jordan wanted to pursue bilateral 
relations and examine ways of developing them in the interest of two brotherly 
peoples.”14 The new king also recently chose Damascus as the destination of his 
highly-symbolic first state visit abroad.
As the PLO creeps back into Jordan through the West Bank, Jordan is drifting 
back into the internal unrest it suppressed at great cost in Black September 1970. 37
King Hussein’s actions over the last decade, especially those of the last two to 
three years, have returned Jordan to being a reflection, rather than the master, of 
the political currents which surround it. Jordan is currently, and will be in the 
future, as exposed to the dangerous drifts of Arab politics as it was before 1970. 
Whether Jordan will succeed in resolutely confronting Palestinian expansionism 
and the threat posed by the PLO to the Hashemite Kingdom depends solely 
on forces outside the kingdom. If Israel, Turkey and the United States emerge 
predominant – which they only will if they reexamine their support for the Oslo 
process and move energetically and resiliently to quell the forming anti-American 
alliance – then King Abdullah may be able to return Jordan to the safe umbrella 
under which it existed quietly from 1970 until 1988. If, however, Iraq, Syria, 
and particularly the PLO, emerge dominant over the next few years – a result 
of which current U.S. and Israeli policy seem tolerant – then it is possible that 
the resulting shape of Jordan would be markedly different from the current 
stable traditionalist government.38
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A Palestinian State: Effects on 
the Regional Balance of Power
Gerald M. Steinberg
F
or the past 50 years, the Middle East has been one of the most unstable 
regions in the world. While the degree of instability has declined in the past 
decade (as evidenced, in part, by the absence of major Arab-Israeli wars), 
the potential for full-scale warfare remains. Radical revisionist states and regimes, 
including Iraq, Iran, and Syria, still use terrorism and military threats in order 
to advance their objectives. The major conflict zones (Arab-Israeli, Persian Gulf, 
Syria-Turkey, etc.) have not disappeared, and the possibility of instability and war 
in one zone spilling over into the others continues.
In this framework, a radical Palestinian State, or a failed state, such as Lebanon, 
Somalia, Haiti, and to an increasing degree Iraq, would add another major 
source of instability. Without a stable sovereign government that possesses an 
effective monopoly on the legitimate use of force, such a state could become 
another Middle Eastern haven and training ground for militias and small non-state 
armies. These forces, or those of a radical Palestinian State allied with Iraq, 
Syria, or Iran, would have a serious destabilizing impact on the balance of 
power in the region. 
By itself, a Palestinian State would be a minuscule military power, easily held 
in check by the vastly more powerful Israeli army. However, in coalition with 
other states in the region, such as Iraq and/or Syria, the abilities of even few and 
lightly armed Palestinians as a force multiplier would be very significant. Thus, 
the assessment of the military impact of a Palestinian State cannot be limited 
to the narrow question of how Palestinians forces would fare in a one-on-one 
confrontation with Israel, but rather must be examined as part of a coalition 
in a wider conflict.
The particular impact of Palestinian participation in a radical coalition will be 
the result of several factors: the combined military capability of such a coalition; 
GERALD STEINBERG is a Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and a 
senior Research Associate at Bar-Ilan’s Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. Mr. 
Steinberg is an expert in the areas of U.S. and Israeli defense policy, unconventional 
weapons and Middle East arms control, and a consultant to the Arms Control Division 
of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is the author of numerous articles and 
publications on arms control and regional security.42
the degree to which Israel maintains control over airspace, the central mountain 
range, the roads that connect the heights to Jordan and Iraq in the east and 
central Israel to the west; and the ability of the Palestinians to provide military 
intelligence on target location, monitoring of activities at military bases, and 
post-attack assessment.
In addition to the threat such capabilities would pose to Israel, a radical 
Palestinian State, or a failed Palestinian State without a strong central government, 
would also contribute to the threat to Jordan and Turkey. While Israel, Jordan 
and Turkey cooperate to form the nucleus of a stable and Western-oriented 
regional security framework (which could eventually include Egypt and perhaps 
other countries), a Palestinian State could strengthen a radical alliance working to 
destabilize the region. Such an alliance, incorporating Syria and Iran (and perhaps 
receiving support from a post-Saddam Iraqi government with stronger Shi’ite 
influence) would be a major source of conflict and terror, and the addition of the 
Palestinians to this group would be significant.  
The Palestinian Connection 
There is a long history of Palestinian participation in military coalitions directed 
against Israel, Jordan, and other Western-oriented states in the region. After the 
1967 war, the PLO set up what amounted to an autonomous zone in Jordan, 
from which they mounted terrorist attacks and raids. During this period, tensions 
mounted between the Hashemite government under King Hussein and the 
Palestinians. In September 1970 (Black September), the Palestinian militia 
mounted a military coup designed to replace the Hashemite Kingdom with a 
Palestinian-controlled regime. In this coup attempt, the Palestinians received 
military support from Syria, whose tanks were forced to return to the Syrian border 
after the Israeli Air Force mobilized to attack them. 
In the 1970s, the Palestinians moved their base of operations to Lebanon, 
where they undermined the Lebanese government and contributed significantly 
to the civil war. Short-term alliances were formed with various Lebanese groups, 
as well as, at various points in the conflict, with Syria. The destabilizing impact 
of the Palestinian use of Lebanon for terrorist operations led directly to the 1982 
Israeli-Syrian confrontation.
In 1990, after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Yasser Arafat went to Baghdad to embrace 
Saddam Hussein. Despite the presence of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in 
Kuwait, the PLO pursued a strongly pro-Iraqi policy, which led to the expulsion 
of these Palestinians. The PLO support for Iraq (both official and popular) 
continued through the 1991 War, and contrasted strongly with the broad Arab 
participation in the American-led coalition. While Egypt, Syria, the North 
African states, and Saudi Arabia all took part, at various levels, in the effort to 
defeat Saddam Hussein, the Palestinians continued their enthusiastic support 
for the Iraqi regime. The enthusiasm was fuelled in part by the Iraqi missile 
attacks against Israel.43
Although Arafat and the PLO hierarchy formally abandoned support for 
Saddam Hussein after the war, shared enemies, feelings of sympathy, and a 
perception of mutual interests have been sustained. During periodic crises between 
the U.S. (and Britain) and Saddam Hussein, Palestinians display their support 
by burning American flags and organizing mass demonstrations. For example, in 
December 1998, immediately following President Clinton’s unprecedented visit to 
Gaza and endorsement of Palestinian goals, the brief U.S.-led attack on Iraq led to 
another wave of demonstrations and flag burning in Palestinian cities. While the 
demonstrations were not officially endorsed by the leadership of the Palestinian 
Authority, the PA’s tight control over political activities shows its tacit support 
of Iraq. It is clear that if Arafat and the PA leadership decided that the price, 
in terms of alienating the U.S., is small enough, the Palestinians would revert 
to their previous behavior and provide widespread support for the radical 
regime in Iraq.
Military Implications Of                                                                                                                             
An Alliance Involving A Palestinian State
Against this background, the creation of a Palestinian State could have serious 
implications in threat scenarios involving Iraq and Syria, separately as well as in 
a combined attack against Israel. Such scenarios continue to be major factors in 
Israeli threat perceptions and military planning. Together, Syria and Iraq could 
deploy over 8,000 main battle tanks, thousands of artillery and mortar launchers, 
and hundreds of combat aircraft, outnumbering Israeli standing forces by as 
much as 4 to 1 (3 to 1 after mobilization of reserves). While Israeli technological 
superiority can offset this quantitative disadvantage, a full-scale Iraqi or Syrian 
conventional attack could still overwhelm Israeli forces, causing very high casualties 
and threatening the survival of the state.  
The magnitude of this threat would increase following the creation of a 
Palestinian State. If Palestinian forces control the area between the Jordan River 
and the “green line” (the borders prior to 1967), Israel would lose all strategic 
depth. At the narrow points outside Tel Aviv, pre-1967 Israel is only 15 kilometers 
wide, and defense of these borders against major conventional attacks is impossible. 
In the absence of any strategic depth, a full-scale attack across any border could 
easily reach major cities in a few hours.  
In this context, any assistance provided by Palestinian forces (either formally 
or informally) to Iraq or Syria would be critical. In order to meet and interdict an 
attack from the East, Israeli forces will have to engage these forces in the Jordan 
Valley before they reach the mountains. However, even a small Palestinian force 
(regular or irregular) operating in this region can harass the IDF, block the main 
East-West corridors, and generally interfere with the mobilization and deployment 
of Israeli forces. If the Palestinians have control over these areas, they will be 
able to mine the roads in coordination with an Iraqi or Syrian attack, slowing 44
or blocking the ability of Israel to meet the oncoming ground forces from the 
East. The roads are narrow and pass through steep ridges, making blockage 
and sabotage relatively easy.
The security deficit resulting from the transfer of control of territory to a 
Palestinian State would be balanced to some degree by improvements in the Israeli 
Air Force. Indeed, the addition of F-15I combat aircraft will enhance Israel’s 
ability to attack offensive air and ground formations before they cross the Jordan 
River. Emphasis on ground attack helicopters such as the Apache, for use against 
tank and artillery columns, has also grown. However, unless the IAF maintains 
full freedom of action over the West Bank, particularly during wartime, Israel’s 
ability to strike attacking ground troops will also be impeded; Palestinians armed 
with shoulder launched anti-aircraft missiles will be able to interfere with the 
activities of the IAF.  
The envelope covered by the Palestinian missile capability will extend well 
beyond the areas controlled by a Palestinian State, and will include central Israel. 
Anti-aircraft systems in this territory, within a few kilometers of air bases, could 
significantly hamper Israeli Air Force operations taking place within Israel itself. 
In 1973, the IDF depended on a large scale American resupply effort, operating 
out of the central Ben Gurion airport near Tel Aviv. This airport is also within the 
envelope of shoulder-launched ground-to-air missiles positioned in the hills above, 
which are likely to be incorporated into a Palestinian State. 
Although many proponents of a Palestinian State argue that demilitarization 
would solve these problems, such simplistic statements ignore the significant barriers 
to enforcement and verification. As the Palestinians gain control of the borders 
and ports in Gaza (including the airport that is now operating), they will be able 
to obtain large numbers of small hand-held SAMs, as well as anti-tank weapons, 
land mines and small arms. Indeed, the IAF already has to assume that in such 
conditions, it will face Palestinians armed with anti-aircraft missiles.
Military Intelligence
The alignment of a Palestinian State with another state or coalition in conflict 
with Israel will also have important consequences in terms of providing 
military intelligence. In the age of satellites, computers, and instant worldwide 
communication, the Palestinians could make a major contribution in the context 
of an alliance with Syria and Iraq. In planning ballistic attacks, these states 
will be able to receive information on the exact location of potential targets. 
Palestinians located on the hills and ridges overlooking Israeli military bases will 
be able to report on the activities within these installations, and on the arrival 
and departure of combat aircraft.  
This intelligence information would also be important in terms of post-attack 
assessment. During the 1991 Gulf War, Israeli military authorities went to great 
lengths to prevent release of information regarding the exact location of missile 
impact points and damage. Such information would have helped the Iraqi forces 45
to redirect their missiles and increase their accuracy. Capabilities for post-attack 
damage assessment after a missile attack, particularly if chemical weapons are used, 
would allow the attackers to determine the degree to which the targets (particularly 
if they are military bases) have been put out of action.  
With significant territorial control, Palestinians could also work with Iraq or 
Syria in blocking Israeli intelligence capabilities. From the high-points in the 
Judean desert and nearby hills, the IDF maintains critical early warning and 
long-range intelligence capabilities. Early detection of large-scale troop movements 
in Iraq and Syria provides Israel with the time to mobilize its ground forces and 
launch preemptive air attacks. When combined with Iraqi or Syrian military 
movements, this form of Palestinian assistance would have a very important and 
negative impact on the balance of power. Similarly, with extensive networks in 
Jordan, the intelligence assets of a Palestinian State could also work with Iraq and 
Syria in undermining Jordanian security.  
A Palestinian State And Iran 
Iran is too far away to pose a conventional military threat to Israel or Jordan, and 
thus a potential Iranian-Palestinian conventional alliance is not realistic. However, 
Iran continues to be the center of radical Islamic and anti-Israeli activity, even after 
the election of Khatami as President and the growth in the power of the “liberals”. 
(Foreign policy appears to be either insulated from Khatami’s influence, or he and 
his followers have a strictly domestic agenda and have no interest in, or ability to, 
change Iranian foreign and security policy. Khatami’s rhetorical attacks on Israel 
are not very different from the language of the other Ayatollahs.) Iran continues to 
support the Hezballah in Lebanon and other terrorists groups in the Middle East. In 
addition, the Iranian ballistic missile program, as well as efforts to obtain weapons of 
mass destruction, has accelerated in the past few years. In July 1998, Iran tested the 
Shahab 3 missile, with a planned range of 1300 kilometers (enough to reach Israel, 
Jordan, and Turkey). These capabilities, combined with an ideology which rejects 
the legitimacy of Israel and the rhetorical threats that accompany this ideology, 
constitute a tangible threat to the region.
Iranian influence among Palestinians is based on support and training for radical 
Islamic groups, such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Hamas has significant influence 
among the Palestinians, and will play a major role in the context of a Palestinian 
State. In the post-Arafat era, Hamas could become the dominant force, turning the 
Palestinian State into a center for radical Islamic activity and terrorism throughout 
the region. In this context, other radical Islamic forces, including Iran, could play 
a heightened role in the process.
There may be some comparisons between the Palestinian environment and 
the situation in Lebanon, where Iran is closely related to the Hezballah terrorist 
group (providing training and weapons). However, there are also some important 
differences in these two cases. Most importantly, Hezballah is composed of Shia 
Muslims from Lebanon, whose close religious links to Iran have existed for many 46
years, and who provided the fertile ground for the radical Islamic policies of the 
government in Teheran. In contrast, Palestinians are part of the Sunni branch 
of Islam, and the religious and cultural links to Iran are relatively limited. Still, 
Iranians have been active in working with Islamic Jihad and Hamas terrorists 
against Israel, and it would be a mistake to ignore potential Iranian influence in 
the context of a Palestinian State.  
Furthermore, while Iran is located at the periphery of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
zone, and Iranian intelligence capabilities vis-a-vis Israel are limited, the Palestinian 
population could provide Iran with vital intelligence information in the event 
of a confrontation. In addition to continued cooperation in terrorist activities, 
Palestinian information on the location of military installations and the activities 
around bases would be useful for Iranian forces planning a missile attack on Israel, 
and for post-attack damage assessment.  
Radical Coalitions
Many analysts and policy makers dismiss these concerns, noting that a Palestinian 
State would be very small and weak compared to Israel, and would not endanger 
its own vital interests or even survival by threatening its neighbors. However, the 
same arguments could have made about Lebanon in the 1970s, which, in many 
ways, was weaker than the prospective Palestinian State. When the government in 
Lebanon self-destructed (with Palestinian and Syrian assistance), Lebanese territory 
provided a base for terrorist training and operations. The ability to operate freely in 
Lebanon served as an important force multiplier for the Palestinians, Syrians and 
Iranians. Similarly, when used by other radical states, or allied with those states, 
a radical Palestinian State would have a major and negative impact on regional 
stability and the balance of power. 
The creation of a radical Palestinian State could also accelerate the development 
of an anti-Western regional alliance (including Syria, Iran, and perhaps Iraq) 
following a regime change. Although Iraq is dominated by Sunni Muslims, and 
has been engaged in a protracted conflict with Iran, the majority of the population 
is Shia. Thus, the development of a Shia-based government in Iraq, with ties to 
Iran, cannot be ruled out. Although the Syrian population is not primarily Shia, 
Syria has been closely allied with Iran for over 20 years, and was the only Arab 
state that provided weapons and support to Iran during its war with Iraq during 
the 1980s. Iran and Syria also share missile technology, and cooperate extensively 
in the development of ballistic missiles. 
Such a radical alliance is likely to be arrayed against a Western-oriented 
cooperative regional security system (either formal or informal) including Israel, 
Jordan, and Turkey, with the possible later addition of Egypt. In this context, the 
assets brought by a Palestinian State to an anti-Western alliance would include 
terrorist operations, the provision of additional military manpower, and, perhaps 
most importantly, intelligence assets. 47
Conclusions
Fifty years of Palestinian terrorism and violence, often in coordination with radical 
Arab groups and states, have not left much room for optimism regarding the 
regional impact of a Palestinian State. A realist view suggests that such a state 
would quickly become allied with the same radical forces that have supported (and 
often directed) various Palestinians groups over the years.  
The history of cooperation and mutual interests between Palestinians and 
leaders of radical states in the region is too strong and deep to be ignored. In 1970, 
despite the differences between Syrian and Palestinian leaders, the Syrian military 
attempted to support the Palestinian effort to overthrow King Hussein and capture 
control of Jordan. After decades of anti-American ideology, and support for a 
range of radical governments, including Saddam Hussein, the recent warmth 
displayed by Arafat towards the U.S. is tactical. The hostility towards the U.S. and 
the West, which is found in many parts of the Arab and Islamic world, remains a 
central component of Palestinian political orientation.  
On this basis, the creation of a Palestinian State is likely to exacerbate the 
tensions and conflicts in the region. Such a state would become a center for radical 
terrorism, and – with control over the territory bordering both Israel and Jordan, 
and allied with Syria or Iraq – add to the military challenges faced by both states 
in the context of a wider regional conflict.4849
International Regulation of a 
Palestinian State 
Ilan Berman  
T
he growing probability of a Palestinian declaration of independence heightens 
the importance of prospects for the international regulation of a Palestinian 
State. In theory, Palestinian statehood would create legal benefits for the 
State of Israel and the international community at large, increasing Palestinian 
accountability for terrorism and applying the legal protections of the law of 
armed conflict to future Israeli-Palestinian hostilities. More likely, however, the 
Palestinian entity will continue to behave without regard for international law. 
In addition, the creation of a Palestinian State would assuredly affect the current 
Israeli-Palestinian security relationship, forcing Israel to revisit its deployment and 
combat tactics and creating a further reduction of its strategic depth and internal 
security. As a result, the risks of conflict between Israel and a Palestinian State 
would become more likely than at present.
Palestinian State Formation in Law and Policy
Currently, the Palestinian National Authority, headed by PLO chairman Yasser 
Arafat and his Cabinet, constitutes the central administrative power for the 
Palestinian people. Despite its governmental capabilities, however, the Palestinian 
Authority is not a fully independent executive body. Under the peace process 
agreements, the West Bank and Gaza Strip are classified as occupied territories 
over which the Israeli government wields controlling executive, legislative and 
judicial powers.1
Notwithstanding this, the Palestinian Authority has developed governing 
powers far in excess of those envisioned by successive Israeli governments. At 
present the Israeli government, while possessing the ability to regulate and monitor 
the activity of the Palestinian government and police force, does not have powers 
with relation to the Palestinian population at large, the defining aspect of the law 
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of occupation.2 In addition, the Palestinian Authority has already exhibited many 
earmarks of traditional statehood, including a police force, flag, and passport. 
Recent arms acquisitions and expansions of the Palestinian police force (over Israeli 
objections) further illustrate the Palestinian Authority’s capacity for independent 
activity. These autonomous actions stand in stark contrast with the language of 
the peace process agreements, which places the Palestinian Authority under the 
purview and administration of the Israeli government. 
However the Authority, despite possessing broader powers and independence 
of action than detailed under the agreements of the peace process, still falls short 
of meeting the requisite criteria for statehood as defined by international law; a) 
a permanent population, b) defined territory, c) government and d) the capacity 
to enter into relations with other states.3 The Israeli-Palestinian agreements, in 
part designed to curtail the status of Palestinian government, specifically limit the 
Authority’s foreign relations powers.4
Statements by Palestinian leaders urging independence have consequently 
generated anxiety in Israel. In November 1998, the Israeli Cabinet declared that 
“…a unilateral declaration by the Palestinian Authority on the establishment of 
a Palestinian state, prior to the achievement of a Final State Agreement, would 
constitute a substantive and fundamental violation of the Interim Agreement.”5 
The Legal Advisor to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has similarly stated 
that a declaration of statehood would run counter to the Declaration of Principles 
and serve as grounds for a nullification of the peace process agreements.6 However, 
a Palestinian declaration of independence will likely not violate customary 
international law, as the agreements signed between Israel and the PLO fail to 
meet the legal standard of ‘international agreement’.7 As a result, a unilateral 
declaration of statehood by the Palestinian Authority, while representing a 
breach of contractual duties, is unlikely to be considered an illegal action under 
international law.
Legal and Security                                                                                                                   
Implications of Palestinian Statehood
Proponents of Palestinian statehood have contended that the creation of a 
Palestinian state is the best method for ensuring and reinforcing Israel’s national 
security.8 In part this argument is based on the assumption that, following 
independence, international law would constrain the Palestinian State. Under the 
regulation of international law, according to this view, a Palestinian State will have 
legal responsibility for the hostile acts of individuals within its borders, and be 
compelled to actively combat cross-border terrorist activity. As well, some have 
extended this reasoning, maintaining that the law of armed conflict will provide 
significant humanitarian guarantees to civilian populations and military forces in 
future Israeli-Palestinian hostilities.9
Practically, however, international law will not ameliorate the security concerns 51
created by a Palestinian State. Nor will it curtail terrorist activities or violence 
directed at civilians during armed conflict. In fact, the imposition of international 
law would likely prove to be a double-edged sword – strictly applied to Israel, as 
has long been the case; and loosely applied to the Palestinian entity. Furthermore, 
international law does not directly apply to other problems of contemporary 
Israeli-Palestinian relations, such as Palestinian incitement and noncompliance with 
peace process norms, which are likely to create future tensions. While historically 
making apologies for cross-border terror attacks on Israel, the international 
community has routinely condemned Israeli military responses. This pattern 
will assuredly continue, as Israel will be faced with domestic and cross-border 
security issues, such as hot pursuit of terrorists and preemptive strikes against 
known terrorist locations.
The creation of a Palestinian State in the territories of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip will also have immediate and critical effects on Israeli security. The period 
since the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 has shown continued 
disregard by the Palestinian Authority for the codified regulatory norms of the 
peace process agreements. These violations have included agitation by Palestinian 
officials and a continued expansion of Palestinian police activities beyond the limit 
permitted by the agreements. Despite formal peace process measures to moderate 
Israeli-Palestinian hostility, PA officials continue to consistently identify with the 
motivations and tactics of anti-Israeli extremist groups.10 Some Palestinian officials 
have adopted a more active position, espousing the intent to wage war upon the 
State of Israel following a Palestinian declaration of independence.11 
The Palestinian Authority has also failed to abide by a number of substantive 
security provisions under the peace process agreements. Specifically, the Palestinian 
Authority has been cited for the continued acquisition and smuggling of illegal 
weaponry in the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories. Israeli intelligence sources 
have noted “a concentrated, continuous and deliberate effort by officials in 
the Palestinian Authority to smuggle arms in their possession…”.12 Activities 
sanctioned by the Palestinian Authority, including illegal arms purchases and 
black market weapons smuggling, constitute serious violations of the negotiated 
agreements, and pose a continuing threat to Israeli security.
The peace process agreements have already drastically altered Israel’s 
contemporary security arrangements. Israel’s topography, historically characterized 
by a narrow waistline and territorial shallowness, has been further compromised 
through the relinquishment of the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories.13 As 
a result of territorial redistribution, Israel’s eastern border has reverted to its 
pre-1967 form, placing the Palestinian Authority only 9 miles (15 kilometers) from 
Netanya. The Tel-Aviv metropolitan area also rests close to proposed Palestinian 
boundaries, spanning only 12 miles from the urban center to the Palestinian 
Authority border. Consequently, the peace process agreements have heightening 
the danger associated with an eruption of hostilities by reducing the distance 
between the Israeli-Palestinian border and Israeli population and industrial centers. 52
The narrow passage created by Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank territory 
has also increased the danger of the country being severed by a relatively small 
hostile force, and virtually eliminated warning times in the event of hostilities. 
Consequently, the reduction of Israeli territory is likely to increase the damage 
suffered by military installations, urban centers and industrial facilities in the 
event of hostilities. 
The peace process agreements have also undermined Israel’s contemporary 
security arrangements, which focus upon the retention of territorial integrity 
through the development of a “forward” military doctrine (whereby the defense of 
territory is accomplished through a rapid shift of hostilities onto enemy territory).14 
The creation of the Palestinian Authority on the non-contiguous land masses of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip has invalidated a transfer of hostilities, positioning 
the Palestinian entity to deliver a two-pronged attack into Israel’s interior. Such an 
offensive, most likely limited to actions designed to impede an IDF mobilization, 
will neutralize Israel’s “forward” posture and force the state to engage in warfare 
within its immediate boundaries, weakening the defense of the nation’s external 
borders. These territorial reductions have therefore forced the IDF to secure 
the entire length of Israel’s borders to prevent a breach by a hostile party.15 
The establishment of a Palestinian State will further exacerbate current military 
concerns regarding Israel’s security structure, compelling Israel to adopt a “trip wire 
defensive posture,” whereby the perception of an aggressive Palestinian military 
stance is more likely to initiate an eruption of hostilities.16
Legal and Practical                                                                                                             
Regulation of Palestinian Terrorism
At present, terrorism remains the single most devastating threat to Israeli security. 
Despite domestic, regional and international initiatives by the State of Israel17, 
terrorist activities and casualties are on the rise. According to official statistics of the 
Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, the death toll attributed to terrorism in the five years 
since the commencement of the Oslo negotiations is equal to that recorded in the 
fifteen years prior to the initiation of the peace process.18 A large part of the threat 
posed by terrorism emanates from the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories, where 
radical Islamic organizations such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad actively 
engage in incitement of violence and terrorist activity directed at the State of Israel. 
The Palestinian Authority government, despite repeated assurances to the State of 
Israel and public affirmations to the international community, has failed to implement 
a resolute counterterrorism plan or to promote nonviolence. 
In theory, the implementation of the law of armed conflict will render state-
sponsored or state-sanctioned terrorist activity illegal. However, powerful entities 
within the Palestinian Authority, as well as independent groups within Palestinian 
society, view terrorism as a legitimate and proven weapon against Israel. Branches 
of the Palestinian Authority, most notably the al-Fatah wing of the PLO, have 53
continued to support terrorism against Israel’s civilian population. Further 
complicating the situation are the varied police forces operating under the PA. 
These groups carry concealed weapons, fail to wear uniforms or distinctive symbols, 
and engage in politically motivated violence. The legal status of these groups 
in wartime is unclear.19 
A declaration of statehood will also theoretically impose legal responsibility 
for curbing terrorism on the Palestinian State.20 At present, Palestinian terrorist 
activity is regulated and addressed solely by Israeli criminal laws and statutes. The 
status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as occupied territories under the legal and 
administrative purview of the Israeli government classify terror attacks emanating 
from these territories as domestic criminal acts. Despite responsibilities articulated 
under the peace process agreements the Palestinian Authority, not yet a state, 
has no legal obligation under international law to control terrorism emanating 
from its territories. As a result, Israel has been forced to rely upon domestic law 
enforcement approaches designed to limit the threat posed by terrorist activity 
to the civilian population, such as the policy of administrative detention. The 
legal effect of a Palestinian State, however, will be to impose responsibility for 
the hostile acts of its citizens directed at the State of Israel. As a result, the 
suppression and elimination of terrorist activity will become a de jure obligation 
under international law.21 
The practical implementation of these rights, however, is likely to be much 
more problematic. Should the Palestinian State be unwilling to, or incapable 
of, upholding its responsibilities, Israel will possess international political and 
economic rights of redress from the United Nations and the international 
community. Israel will not, however, gain added recourses under international law 
for a Palestinian failure to discharge its responsibilities with regard to terrorism.22 
Similarly, international law does not sanction Israeli retaliation for terrorism 
emanating from the Palestinian State.23 
Israel’s future problems in seeking international recourse are likely to be 
comparable to the current shortcomings of international law in regulating the 
unrest in Lebanon. Since the mid-1960s, Lebanon has been plagued by continued 
political turmoil, highlighted by the establishment of Palestinian terrorist bases 
and the outbreak of civil war. Despite the legal principles of civilian immunity 
and state responsibility, Israel continues to be threatened by military actions and 
hostile activity over which the Lebanese government possesses little, if any, control. 
Given the marked inability of international law to normalize Israeli-Lebanese 
relations, international regulation of Palestinian hostility or noncompliance is 
likely to be similarly ineffectual.
Neither are halfway measures adopted by the Israeli government likely to be 
effective in ameliorating the strategic threat posed by Palestinian statehood. In 
recent years, Israeli policymakers have increasingly considered the option of a 
Palestinian entity possessing the trappings of statehood but devoid of military 
capabilities and regulated by Israeli security concerns. Israeli Senior Advisor David 54
Bar-Ilan has expressed the possibility of Palestinian statehood, if circumscribed 
by “limited sovereignty.”24 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has similarly 
advocated “restrained self-determination,” and likened the Israeli model for a 
Palestinian State to quasi-nationhood similar to Andorra or Puerto Rico.25
However, the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian state is highly unlikely. 
At present, the Palestinian Authority possesses greater military powers than those 
delineated by the peace process agreements. According to recent reports, the 
Palestinian police force numbers far in excess of the figures permitted under the 
peace process negotiations.26 Similarly, the Palestinian Authority has been active in 
arms acquisitions and military training. These developments highlight continued 
attempts by the Palestinian Authority to bolster its military capability. In light 
of these inclinations, it seems unlikely that the Palestinian government (or the 
Palestinian community itself) will accept demilitarization. 
A Palestinian State                                                                                                                                   
Under the International Legal Order?
A Palestinian State will act as a continuing danger and source of instability 
for the State of Israel. In theory, the creation of a Palestinian State will herald 
the application of international law, which will act to regulate current issues 
complicating Israeli-Palestinian relations. The critical destabilizing effects 
a Palestinian State will have on Israeli security, however, will dramatically 
outweigh the potential benefits of international law. A Palestinian declaration of 
independence, by invalidating the security frameworks created by the peace process 
agreements, will alter Palestinian responsibility with regard to Israel’s domestic 
security and border stability. This change, coupled with territorial reductions 
which reduce Israeli strategic depth and invalidate contemporary military doctrine, 
actually raises the danger of an eruption of hostilities by forcing Israel to adopt a 
heightened defensive posture. From an elevated defensive stance, Israel is likely 
to react aggressively in response to a perceived Arab threat. Furthermore, current 
Palestinian violations of the terms of the peace process agreements, including calls 
to incitement and illegal arms acquisitions, are likely to magnify the possibility of 
Israeli-Palestinian hostilities following the creation of a Palestinian State.55
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